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INTRODUCTION
Americans often appear to be as much devoted to competitive athlet-
ics as they are to religious observance, the First Commandment notwith-
standing.' There is, in fact, a great deal of evidence suggesting that
athletic competition and religious observance are, in many cultures and
in many faith traditions, complementary if not convergent endeavors.
In the United States, in particular, the last two decades have witnessed
an unprecedented public mixture of athletics and religious faith,3 leading
some to suggest that sport has itself become another-if not the-Amer-
ican religion.4
1. Exodus 20:2-3 ("I am the Lord your God ... ; you shall have no other gods before
me.").
2. See, e.g., Mark S. Rosentraub, Governing Sports in the Global Era: A Political Economy
of Major League Baseball and Its Stakeholders, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 121, 124
(2000) (discussing the historical interplay between religion and sports across cultures); Judy
Harrison, Sports a Soul-Saving Activity, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Me.), Nov. 25, 2000 (describ-
ing the evolution of the modern convergence of religion and sports in the United States, based
on the work of historian William J. Baker), available at 2000 WL 28978115. See generally
SPORT AND RELIGION (Shirl J. Hoffman ed., 1992).
3. See, e.g., Jarrett Bell, Religion in Heart of NFL, USA TODAY, Dec. 24, 1996, at Cl,
available at 1996 WL 15362151: John Blake, Power Christianity: Athletes Are Becoming More
Open and Outspoken About Their Faith, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 14, 1996, at G4, available
at 1996 WL 8246340; Deborah Kovach Caldwell, It's Faith in Numbers-More Athletes Going
Public with Religion, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Jan. 15, 1997, at El, available at 1997 WL
3157531; Jason Cole, Jaguars Make Religion a Part of the Game Plan, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lau-
derdale), Jan. 9, 1997, at ClO, available at 1997 WL 3079297; Mark Kram, Locker-Room Evan-
gelism Infiltrates Pro Sports, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 13, 1988, at ClO, available at 1988 WL
3389117; Robert Lipsyte, The Crossing of Faith and Big-Time Sport, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,2001,
available at 2001 WL-NYT 0106300040. For a more historical assessment of the evangelical
Protestant influences, see TONY LADD & JAMES A. MATHISEN, MUSCULAR CHRISTIANITY:
EVANGELICAL PROTESTANTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN SPORT (1999).
4. See generally ROBERT J. HIGGS, GOD IN THE STADIUM: SPORTS AND RELIGION IN
AMERICA (1995); CHARLES S. PREBISH, RELIGION AND SPORT: THE MEETING OF SACRED
AND PROFANE (1992); FROM SEASON TO SEASON: SPORTS AS AMERICAN RELIGION (Joseph L.
Price ed., 2001).
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Ordinarily, these two commitments-the athletic and the religious-
can both be honored without serious conflict or negative consequence.
5
But not always. One need only recall the famous refusal of Sandy
Koufax to pitch on Yom Kippur during the 1965 World Series,6 or more
recently (and less famously) the unwillingness of Islamic NBA player
Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf to stand during the pre-game national anthem.
7
Of course, the vast majority of such collisions garner little national atten-
tion. Yet it is generally amidst these less publicized conflicts, typically
involving amateur interscholastic athletes, that the religious rights of
sports competitors are most often put to the test.8
The primary purpose of this article is to delineate the religious rights
of interscholastic athletes under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment at a time when athletes appear increasingly willing to assert
these rights,9 and courts appear more willing to recognize them.10 To
5. This was not always the case. Sunday laws, for example, often expressly forbade cer-
tain athletic activities, particularly those deemed incompatible with the solemnity of Sabbath
observance. See, e.g., Carolina Amusement Co. v. Martin, 115 S.E.2d 273, 274 (S.C. 1960),
cert. denied, 367 U.S. 904 (1961); State v. Thornbury, 69 P.2d 815, 815-16 (Wash. 1937); State v.
Dean, 184 N.W.2d 275, 275 (Minn. 1921); Koelble v. Woods, 159 N.Y.S. 704, 705 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1916); Hiller v. State, 92 A. 842, 842 (Md. 1914).
6. For accounts of the Koufax incident, see Rabbi Lee Bycel, Sandy Koufax Taught Pride
to Generation of Young Jews, JEWISH BULL. N. CAL. ONLINE, Sept. 20, 1996, at http://www.
jewishsf.com/bk960920/comm2.htm; Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflec-
tions on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CADozo L. REv. 1577, 1579-83 (1993).
7. Abdul-Rauf was suspended for the refusal, see NBA Suspends Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf
A Matter of Respect, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Mar. 18, 1996, at A6, available at
1996 WL 5988258, but he subsequently agreed to stand with the caveat that he would silently
pray during the anthem. Abdul-Rauf Decides To Stand Up and Pray, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Mar. 15, 1996, at D8, available at 1996 WL 7017135. Regarding the suspension's legality, see
generally Kelly B. Koenig, Note, Mahmoud Abdul-Raufs Suspension for Refusing to Stand for
the National Anthem: A "Free Throw" for the NBA and Denver Nuggets, or a "Slam Dunk"
Violation ofAbdul-Raufs Title VII Rights?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 377 (1998).
8. See, e.g., Debbie Fetterman, Religious Sacrifice: Kimball Star Damon Arnette Won't
Play on Sabbath, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 25, 1994, at B1 (reporting on a Seventh Day
Adventist high school basketball player who, observing his Sabbath from sundown Friday to
sundown Saturday, was compelled to miss Friday night games, and citing the earlier case of a
collegiate basketball player who belonged to the Worldwide Church of God and likewise
missed games for Sabbath observance), available at 1994 WL 6115006; Irene Garcia, Team
Harassed Over Skullcaps, L.A. TiMEs, Jan. 22, 1995, at B1 (reporting instances of alleged
adverse treatment, by referees, players, and spectators, of Jewish basketball players for wear-
ing yarmulkes), available at 1995 WL 2007840; Soccer Game Forfeited for Religious Reasons,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis), July 5, 1996, at D2 (reporting that a referee told a youth soccer
player that tournament rules precluded the player from wearing a head covering, notwith-
standing that such a head covering was required by his Sikh religious beliefs), available at 1996
WL 9912461.
9. Gil Fried & Lisa Bradley, Applying the First Amendment to Prayer in a Public Univer-
sity Locker Room: An Athlete's and Coach's Perspective, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 301, 311 (1994)
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this end, the article will proceed in two parts. Part I will provide a com-
prehensive overview of contemporary free exercise doctrine, followed by
a brief summary of other laws that may govern religion-related conflicts
arising in the context of interscholastic athletics.11 Part II will then sur-
vey the types of controversies that can arise in this context and will ex-
amine their resolution in light of the governing laws. Part II will also
offer guidelines to coaches and administrators for the prevention and
resolution of such conflicts, including steps that can be taken to avoid
First Amendment violations and, thus, legal liability.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
For Americans, the most familiar and universal religious liberty guar-
antees are those of the First Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, which forbid any governmental entity from enacting or enforcing
laws or rules that either "respect[ ] an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibit[ ] the free exercise thereof .... "12 It is the latter of these guaran-
tees, the so-called Free Exercise Clause, that is the principal focus of this
article. By no means, of course, is this provision the only source of po-
tential protection for the religious beliefs and practices of interscholastic
athletes. As Section B will illustrate, there exist many federal and state
provisions, both constitutional and regulatory, that may afford such pro-
tection, some more generously than the Free Exercise Clause itself.
Before proceeding to the main analysis, a few prefatory comments
are necessary. First, readers should bear in mind that it is the religious
practices or sensibilities of an athlete, and not the athletic participation
itself, that the Constitution protects. From time to time, perhaps due to
(noting an increased willingness of student-athletes to assert their legal rights); Mark Silk,
Freedom of Religion Wins One in Athletics, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., Mar. 20, 1993, at F6 (surmis-
ing that recent cases involving conflicts between collegiate athletic schedules and religious
observance by athletes "reflect a growing readiness on the part of members of minority reli-
gions to ask athletic associations to accommodate their religious needs"), available at 1993 WL
3349560. See also Robert L. McGahey, Jr., A Comment on the First Amendment and the
Scholar-Athlete, 6 HuM. RTs. 155, 157 (1977) (noting early indications of the willingness of
student athletes to assert their First Amendment rights).
10. See generally M. Chester Nolte, Judicial Intervention in School Athletics: The Changing
Scene, 8 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1983).
11. Regarding the religious rights of coaches and other athletic personnel, see GEORGE
W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW § 3.3, at 78-79 (1986).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "). Although textually applicable only to
Congress, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment imposes those substantive limitations on the legisla-
tive power of the States and their political subdivisions." Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000).
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the social and developmental importance of student athletics, the public
and the media, when viewing a conflict between an athlete's religious
beliefs and an administrative rule, will seemingly fixate on the possible
loss of athletic participation that may result from the conflict. But, un-
less the athlete is claiming a religious basis for the participation itself,
this emphasis is misplaced. There is, after all, no independent constitu-
tional right to engage in interscholastic athletics,' 3 either as a species of
liberty (protected against deprivations independently) or as a species of
property (protected against deprivations absent procedural due pro-
cess),' 4 although some courts have recognized that state law may create
a protectable interest 5 or that there may be an attendant property inter-
est related to scholarships, future professional participation, or the over-
all educational process. 6 In fact, government schools or associations are
presumably not constitutionally required to establish athletic programs
at all, and it is only because they do so that the Constitution's guaran-
tees, such as the Free Exercise Clause, come into play.1 7
. 13. Much less is there a right to attend summer athletic camps. Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d
1027, 1029 (Former 5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting claims that "parents possess a fundamental right
to send their children to summer athletic camps" and that "the children have a constitutional
right to attend such activities"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120 (1982).
14. The U.S. Supreme Court has never so held, but several U.S. Courts of Appeals and
state supreme courts have. Graham v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 959
(6th Cir. 1986); Hardy v. University Interscholastic League, 759 F.2d 1233, 1234 (5th Cir.
1985); In re United States ex reL Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 682 F.2d 147, 151
(8th Cir. 1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd,
460 U.S. 719 (1983); Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492, 497 (1st
Cir. 1977); Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983, 984-85 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Denis J.
O'Connell High Sch. v. Virginia High Sch. League, 581 F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 936 (1979); Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlsberg by Carlsberg, 694
N.E.2d 222, 242 (Ind. 1997); Arkansas Activities Ass'n v. Meyer, 805 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Ark.
1991); Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 758 P.2d 968, 972 (Wash. 1988);
Eanes Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Logue, 712 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. 1986). Courts have also rejected
the notion that athletes are a "suspect class" under the Equal Protection Clause. Missouri
State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 682 F.2d at 152. Nor is athletic participation a fundamental
right under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Alerding v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
779 F.2d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 1985).
15. See, e.g., Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1047-49 (E.D.
Wis. 2000).
16. Haverkamp v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 380, 689 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D. Kan. 1986);
Weiss v. Eastern Coll. Athletic Conference, 563 F. Supp. 192, 196 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Tiffany
by Tiffany v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 726 P.2d 231, 234-35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
17. See, e.g., Robbins by Robbins v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 941 F. Supp.
786, 791 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 334
A.2d 839,842 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); Bell v. Lone Oak Indep. Sch. Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636,638
(Tex. App. 1974).
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Second, like most federal constitutional provisions, the Free Exercise
Clause is binding only on the actions of the government, whether fed-
eral, state, or local. Private or nongovernmental educational institutions,
in other words, are not independently subject to the strictures of the
First Amendment.18 In particular, virtually all of the Constitution's lib-
erty provisions contemplate a threshold requirement that the allegedly
violative conduct be governmental or "state action."19 Of course, this
requirement is generally not difficult to satisfy when the athlete is di-
rectly challenging a rule, policy, or decision of a public school or school
board or of a coach or administrator acting on the school's behalf.2" As
the Supreme Court has recently held, moreover, the state action inher-
ent in such entities and their decisions cannot necessarily be laundered
through mere associations or affiliations with private institutions.21
18. See, e.g., Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 188-92 (D.
Conn. 1998) (dismissing a free exercise challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for want of state
action), affid, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 201 (2001); Joshua C. Wein-
berger, Comment, Religion and Sex in the Yale Dorms: A Legislative Proposal Requiring Pri-
vate Universities To Provide Religious Accommodations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 205,216-19 (1998)
(discussing this aspect of Hack). In fact, where an athlete challenges a private institution's
religiously-based decisions, it may be the institution, rather than the athlete, that is the free
exercise claimant. Matthew J. Mitten, Amateur Athletes with Handicaps or Physical Abnor-
malities: Who Makes the Participation Decision?, 71 NEB. L. REV. 988, 1001-02, 1004, 1014-15,
1022 (1992) (discussing instances in which Roman Catholic schools have argued, or might
argue, that their refusal to allow an athlete to play due to health concerns is based on the
religious tenet of preserving human life, and that a governmental ruling mandating participa-
tion would violate their institutional free exercise rights); see also Windsor Park Baptist
Church, Inc. v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 658 F.2d 618, 621-23 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding
against a free exercise challenge a state athletic association's exclusion of a religious school
that refused to obtain state accreditation).
19. See generally HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 2.10-2.11 (2001). One who asserts a federal constitutional claim against a
municipal or state defendant must generally do so under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than directly
under the Constitution itself. Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 732 n.3 (7th Cir.
1994); Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the state action re-
quirement is, in the first instance, really a statutory element, usually subsumed under the re-
quirement that the defendant have acted "under color" of state law. Reed v. City of Chicago,
77 F.3d 1049, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996) ("To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that: (1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States, and (2) the defendant acted under color of state law.").
20. LEwIs & NORMAN, supra note 19, § 2.11, at 68; Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411,
416 (D. Vt. 1970) ("[S]tate action is readily found in the acts of duly elected or appointed
officials at all levels of the governmental hierarchy within the state. The action of a local
school board is state action within the context of the fourteenth amendment."). Conversely,
"[wihen addressing whether a private party acted under color of law, [the court] ... start[s]
with the presumption that private conduct does not constitute governmental action." Sutton
v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
21. Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 924, 934
(2001) (finding state action in statewide association's regulation of interscholastic athletics
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A. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
The Free Exercise Clause basically entails a balancing of the respec-
tive interests of the claimant (the athlete asserting the challenge) and the
government or the public, where the precise balance or level of judicial
scrutiny will vary upon the claimant's initial evidentiary showings. What
follows is a generalized overview of this balancing methodology, includ-
ing key opportunities and limitations for both claimants and governmen-
tal defendants.
1. Elements of the Claimant's Prima Facie Case
Ordinarily, a free exercise claimant must first demonstrate that the
government, by rule or policy, has placed a constitutionally significant
burden on a practice that is sufficiently related to the claimant's sin-
cerely held religious beliefs.22 As this phrasing implies, not all burdens
are constitutionally significant, not all practices are sufficiently related to
a claimant's beliefs, and not all beliefs are religious. Normally, only bur-
dens which are "substantial"'  or "undu[e]" 4 -especially those which
are truly prohibitory or punitive-will trigger the clause.2' Likewise,
there are some indications that the clause protects only those practices
which are "central" to the claimant's religion26 or which are mandated,
among public and private secondary schools, where the association was, among other things,
predominantly composed of public schools, overwhelmingly governed by public school offi-
cials, and fiscally tied to the state's retirement system); see also Clark by Clark v. Arizona
Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1128 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983);
Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 682 F.2d at 151 (8th Cir. 1982). For further analysis,
see generally Alan R. Madry, Statewide School Athletic Associations and Constitutional Liabil-
ity: Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12 MARO.
SPORTS L. REv. 365 (2001).
22. These are not phrased as absolute requirements because some courts have held that
"if a law is not neutral and of general applicability, a plaintiff is not required to prove that his
or her free exercise of religion has been 'substantially burdened."' Rader v. Johnston, 924 F.
Supp. 1540, 1543 n.2 (D. Neb. 1996) (citing Hartmann v. Stone, 68 F.3d 973, 979 n.4 (6th Cir.
1995); Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, Pa., 35 F.3d 846, 849 (3d Cir. 1994)).
23. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
25. See, e.g., Civil Liberties for Urban Believers (C.L.U.B.) v. City of Chicago, 157 F.
Supp. 2d 903, 914 (N.D. Ill. 2001) ("A substantial burden exists when the government pres-
sures a plaintiff to modify her behavior and violate her beliefs, by, for example, discriminating
against her because of her religious belief, inhibiting her dissemination of particular religious
views or pressuring her to forgo a religious practice.").
26. See, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699; Forest Hills Early Learning Ctr., Inc. v. Lukhard,
728 F.2d 230, 240 (4th Cir. 1984). But cf. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 887 n.4 (1990) (questioning the validity of the inquiry into centrality and observ-
ing that "'[c]onstitutionally significant burden' would seem to be 'centrality' under another
name").
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rather than simply motivated, by the claimant's religious beliefs.27 Fi-
nally, the clause by its text protects only exercise rooted in "religion,"2
so that mere philosophical beliefs, even if strongly held, will not suffice.
29
The substantial burden requirement, in particular, has proven espe-
cially difficult for athletes to satisfy. To some extent this may be attribu-
table to the elusive nature of the requirement itself, which is not well-
defined and may serve, in some cases, as a "gatekeeper doctrine[ ],...
function[ing] to increase the likelihood of failure at the prima facie
stage'"30 and specifically "obviat[ing] the need for judicial determination
of other, perhaps more troubling questions."31 This lack of success may
also be attributable to the initial premise that athletic participation
standing alone is not a constitutionally protected interest,32 or that it is
voluntary and extracurricular,33 which may cause judges to dwell on the
legal insignificance of athletic nonparticipation rather than on the relig-
ious basis of the claimant's predicament.34 Whatever the reason, courts
generally have been unreceptive to allegations where the religious prac-
27. Compare Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying a
mandatoriness standard under Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)), with Kikumura
v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 960-61 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying a motivation standard under RFRA
as amended), and Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 670 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (applying a motivation-type standard under the Free Exercise Clause).
28. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
707, 713 (1981) ("Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause,
which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion."); cf. Alvarado v. City
of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting similar requirement for the Estab-
lishment Clause). Nonetheless, courts have held that the Establishment Clause also protects
the nonreligious from religious coercion. Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 528 F. Supp.
919, 921 (D.N.M. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Friedman v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Seegers
v. Parker, 241 So. 2d 213, 216 n.4 (La. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
29. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216; McGlothin v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp.
853, 865-66 & n.19 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
30. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 935 (1989).
31. Id. at 936; see also id. at 953-60 (examining the types of troubling questions that can be
avoided, including the claimant's sincerity and the religiosity of the claimant's beliefs or
practices).
32. SCHUBERT, supra note 11, at 77 (speculating that this premise may skew the balancing
analysis).
33. Butler, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 ("[B]y choosing to go out for the team, high school
athletes voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that im-
posed on students generally." (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657
(1995))).
34. See, e.g., Calandra by Calandra v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 512 A.2d 809, 811 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1986) (holding that an interscholastic baseball program could exclude a would-be
participant who refused for religious reasons to receive a tetanus immunization, finding that
"participation in interscholastic sports ... does not rise to the level of an important govern-
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tice is not an essential or mandatory aspect of the athlete's faith,35 where
the athlete or the athlete's parents did not undertake all possible steps to
avoid or mitigate the conflict,36 or where the administrative rule (such as
a transfer ineligibility rule) was already in place and the conflict arose
from the claimant's or claimant's parents' subsequent religiously moti-
vated decisions. 7
2. Limitations on the Government's Rebuttal
To the extent that a claimant makes these initial evidentiary show-
ings, which comprise the elements of a prima facie free exercise claim,
the government may then attempt to challenge their factual or legal suf-
ficiency. In so doing, however, the government may find that some of its
efforts are restricted by, of all things, the First Amendment. In particu-
lar, courts are manifestly uncomfortable with the notion that either they
or any other governmental entity should be able to second-guess a claim-
ant's allegation that his or her beliefs constitute a "religion" or that the
burdened practice is "religious," much less that the claimant's religious
belief or practice is adequate.3 The issue merits some attention in this
ment benefit" and therefore the administrative exclusion does not burden the child's free
exercise of religion).
35. See, e.g., Griffin High Sch. v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 822 F.2d 671,674 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding no interference with important or fundamental religious tenets by application of a
transfer rule); Menora v. Illinois High Sch. Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1033-34 (7th Cir. 1982) (find-
ing no burden on Jewish basketball players who, because of a no-headwear rule, could not
wear yarmulkes, where Jewish law did not specifically dictate the type of head covering that
must be worn), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); Robbins, 941 F. Supp. at 792 (finding no
evidence of "'grave interference with important... religious tenets"' by application of a
transfer rule (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218)); Keller by Keller v. Gardner Cmty. Consol.
Grade Sch. Dist. 72C, 552 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (finding that a rule precluding
elementary school basketball players who miss a practice, except in cases of illness or death in
the family, from playing in the next scheduled game did not impose a burden on the free
exercise of religion of a player who missed practices due to catechism classes because the
classes were not truly mandatory).
36. See, e.g., Valencia v. Blue Hen Conference, 476 F. Supp. 809, 822 (D. Del. 1979) (sus-
taining a conference's refusal to admit a religious school, holding among other things that the
refusal did not burden the parents' free exercise rights because "there are means available to
[the school] and the plaintiffs to alleviate the burdens complained of here that do not create
any conflicts with the precepts of the Catholic religion"), affd, 615 F.2d 1355 (3d Cir. 1980).
37. See, e.g., Walsh v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir.
1980) (rejecting student's challenge to "student transfer rule," making student attending high
school outside his home district ineligible to participate in interscholastic athletics for one
year, because of "the de minimis nature of the burden placed on the plaintiffs' free exercise of
religion"), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Cooper v. Oregon Sch. Activities Ass'n, 629 P.2d
386, 390-91 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
38. Only a few courts have attempted to formulate systematically a constitutional defini-
tion of religion. See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430,
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article because school administrators are periodically confronted with
unusual or unorthodox beliefs and practices, and therefore run the risk
of reflexively utilizing a conventional definition of religion, rejecting an
unconventional claim out of hand, and violating (unwittingly) both the
Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses. To prevent this, adminis-
trators should carefully consider the following judicial admonitions.
First, while the government is not entirely disabled from deeming a
claimant's beliefs or practices categorically nonreligious,39 it cannot do
so merely because they are "not ... acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others,"4 inconsistent with the beliefs of fellow ad-
herents to the same religion,41 or only recently acquired or apprehended
438-41 (2d Cir. 1981); Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1031-36 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982). The larger problem of defining religion is examined in Daniel 0.
Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neu-
trality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 28-32 (2000); Val D. Ricks, To God God's, To
Caesar Caesar's, and To Both the Defining of Religion, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1053 (1993);
Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition of Religion,
61 TEX. L. REV. 139 (1982).
39. Ben-Yahudah v. Bolden, No. 94-2438, 1996 WL 571145, at *4 n.1 (6th Cir. Oct. 3,
1996) ("The [s]tate ... obviously has no business deciding whether any religion is 'true' in a
theological sense, but we assume for purposes of this opinion that it is not inappropriate for
the state to determine whether a group of prisoners seeking permission to worship together
will in fact be meeting for purposes that can fairly be termed 'religious."').
40. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714; see also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) ("[I]t
is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one group is not
religion under the protection of the First Amendment."). But cf Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715
(conceding that a claim might be "so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to
be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause").
41. See, e.g., Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699 ("It is not within the judicial ken to question the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants'
interpretations of those creeds."); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 457-58 (1988) (rejecting an approach that "would require us to rule that some relig-
ious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs").
Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits
that he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the
clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ .... Intrafaith
differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed ....
[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the
members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judi-
cial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow
[adherent] more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are
not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16. See also Doswell v. Smith, No. 94-6780, 1998 WL 110161, at *3
(4th Cir. Mar. 13, 1998) (stating that a religious "practitioner's understanding of the origins,
exact contours, or reasons for... [a] particular practice may be mistaken, or incomplete, or at
serious odds with the understanding of others holding the belief, including even those most
expert by education or experience in interpreting its true nature, is beside the point"). But see
State v. Phelps, 967 P.2d 304, 311 (Kan. 1998) ("The First Amendment to the United States
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by the claimant.42 These considerations may be relevant to a determina-
tion of whether the claimant's beliefs are sincerely held, but they gener-
ally cannot be employed to assess whether those beliefs are in the first
instance religious. Second, while the government may permissibly con-
clude as a factual matter that a certain religious belief is not sincerely
held by a claimant,4" the government may not assess the ultimate valid-
ity-that is, the "'truth or falsity,' 'reasonableness,' 'verity,' 'correct-
ness,' or 'worthiness'""--of the religious belief itself.45 As one federal
judge recently explained:
Under the United States Constitution, an individual's right to be-
lieve in anything he or she chooses is unquestioned. Religious
beliefs are not required to be consistent, or logical, or acceptable
to others. Governmental questioning of the truth or falsity of the
beliefs themselves is proscribed by the First Amendment. A re-
ligious belief can appear to every other member of the human
race preposterous, yet merit the protections of the Bill of Rights.
Popularity, as well as verity, are inappropriate criteria.46
For its part, the judiciary has thus typically erred towards an inclusive
conception of religion, often bypassing the issue entirely and simply as-
suming for adjudication purposes that a particular claim is, in fact, relig-
Constitution... does not.., allow one to commit a crime and then seek protection based on a
personal interpretation of the Bible not shared by a recognized religious group or clearly
exercised as a religious act.").
42. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) ("The
First Amendment protects the free exercise rights of employees who adopt religious beliefs or
convert from one faith to another after they are hired. The timing of [the employee's] conver-
sion is immaterial to our determination that her free exercise rights have been burdened
43. See, e.g., Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521, 1523, 1526-27 (10th Cir. 1991) (elaborat-
ing on the nature of the sincerity analysis), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 895 (1993); Lipton v. Peters,
No. SA-99-CA-0235-EP, 1999 WL 33289705, at *4-*5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1999) (finding in-
sincerity), affd, 240 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 2000).
44. Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219,221 (2000) (respectively quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
407 (1963); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Smith by Smith v. Board of Educ., 844 F.2d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 1988); Kaplan v.
Hess, 694 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
45. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[lt is entirely
appropriate, indeed necessary, for a court to engage in analysis of the sincerity-as opposed,
of course, to the verity-of someone's religious beliefs in... the free exercise context...."),
affd, 479 U.S. 60 (1986); United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 938 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(similar); Cohen v. United States, 297 F.2d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 1962) (similar), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 865 (1962); Ala. & Coushatta Tribes v. Treasurers of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.
Supp. 1319, 1328 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
46. Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F. Supp. 2d 748, 762 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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iOus.4 7  What this means for school officials-whether principals,
teachers, athletic administrators, or coaches-is that they, too, should err
on the side of inclusion and must never, under any circumstances, sum-
marily reject an athlete's religious claim on the ground that it is believed
to be mistaken, heretical, or incredible.
3. Levels and Components of Judicial Scrutiny
Should the claimant successfully demonstrate the substantial burden-
ing of a religious practice, and should this demonstration go unrebutted,
the challenged regulation will then be subjected to one of two levels of
judicial scrutiny.48 Under current free exercise doctrine, strict scrutiny
obtains if the regulation is not religiously neutral,49 if it is not generally
applicable,5" if the government refuses to consider a religious exemption
even though the regulation "len[ds] itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct[,] 51 or, possibly, if the
free exercise claim is asserted "in conjunction with other constitutional
protections."52 In such instances, the evidentiary burden shifts to the
government to demonstrate that its action "advance[s] 'interests of the
highest order' and .. . [is] narrowly tailored in pursuit of those inter-
47. See, e.g., Wells v. City & County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1152 (10th Cir. 2001)
("assum[ing], without deciding, that atheism is a religion for First Amendment purposes");
Kunselman v. Western Reserve Local Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 931, 931 (6th Cir. 1995) ("assum[ing]
that Satanism or the Church of Satan is a 'religion' for purposes of summary judgment");
Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 27 F.3d 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1994) ("assum[ing],
without deciding, that [witchcraft or Wicca] is a religion for the purpose of this appeal"); Haff
v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("assum[ing], without deciding, that Iden-
tity Christianity is a religion"); Church of Iron Oak, Inc. ATC v. City of Palm Bay, 868 F.
Supp. 1361, 1362 n.1 (M.D. Fla. 1994) ("assum[ing] without deciding that Wicca is a 'religion'
within the meaning of applicable federal law"), affd, 110 F.3d 797 (11th Cir. 1997); Faheem-E1
v. Lane, No. 82 C 4404, 1984 WL 717, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Il. June 29, 1984) (assuming that "the El
Rukn Science Temple ... is a valid religion"); cf. Muhammad v. Giant Food, Inc., No. Civ.
JFM-98-3565, 2000 WL 1828248, at *5 n.4 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 2000) ("assum[ing] for the purpose
of this memorandum that the Million Man March constitutes a religious holiday").
48. This may not be entirely accurate. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v.
City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 n.7 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying by assumption "an intermediate
level of scrutiny ... since this case arose in the public employment context and since the
Department's actions cannot survive even that level of scrutiny"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 817
(1999). For a discussion of whether intermediate standards of scrutiny should or do apply
specifically within the primary and secondary educational context, see Eugene Volokh, Inter-
mediate Questions of Religious Exemptions-A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 595, 658-61 (1999).
49. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 546
(1993); Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
50. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531, 542, 546; Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
51. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
52. Id. at 881.
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ests '" 53 or, more succinctly, that it is "necessary to effectuate a compel-
ling interest."54 In all other cases, rational basis scrutiny applies, and the
evidentiary burden remains with the claimant to demonstrate that the
action is not rationally or reasonably related to a legitimate government
interest.55
In actuality, the appropriate standard of judicial review has for sev-
eral years been the source of both interpretive discord within the Su-
preme Court and institutional wrangling between the Court and
Congress. Beginning in the 1960s, the Court's opinions indicated that in
any instance where a claimant could demonstrate a substantial govern-
mental burden on a religious practice rooted in sincerely held religious
beliefs, the government had to prove that its law was necessary to
achieve a compelling interest (strict scrutiny), even if the law was neutral
and generally applicable and the free exercise burden was merely inci-
dental or inadvertent. 6 In 1990, however, the Court definitively re-
jected this reading of the First Amendment5 holding instead that strict
scrutiny is triggered only when there arises one of the conditions noted
above, such as lack of neutrality or lack of general applicability.5 In
1993, Congress responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act,59 known by the rather canicular acronym "RFRA." Statuto-
rily, RFRA purported to reimpose the strict scrutiny standard upon all
state and local (and federal) laws, including neutral and generally appli-
cable laws, that placed a substantial burden, even incidentally, on a
claimant's religious practices. Then, in 1997, the Court held that
RFRA's application to state and local governments exceeded Congress's
53. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)
(plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407 (re-
quiring that there be "no alternative forms of regulation [which] would combat such abuses
without infringing First Amendment rights").
54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883 (dictum).
55. Hyman v. City of Louisville, 132 F. Supp. 2d 528,538 (W.D. Ky. 2001). Smith does not
expressly impose a rationality requirement as such, but it is implicit in the requirement that
the government action must, at the very least, be "consistent with the Federal Constitution."
Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
56. See, e.g., Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141-42; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215;
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80; see also City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 531.
58. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-84; Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the Details: Neutral,
Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1051-60
(2000) (discussing the underlying purposes, doctrinal modifications, and wider implications of
the Smith decision).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4 (1994).
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enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment,60 once again
leaving neutral and generally applicable state and local laws largely sub-
ject only to rational basis review as a matter of federal law. Finally, in
2000, Congress enacted yet another religious freedom statute, the Relig-
ious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.6 1 But while this stat-
ute, like RFRA, reapplies the strict scrutiny standard to the decisions of
state and local government,62 as its title implies it does so only to deci-
sions relating to land use and institutionalized persons (which student
athletes are not).63 The end result, therefore, is that after several years
of judicial and congressional sparring, state and local governmental deci-
sionmaking that burdens the religious practices of student athletes will
now, as a matter of federal law, for the most part be subject to rational
basis review, absent one of the conditions noted above.
Of the two possible standards of judicial review, of course, rational
basis scrutiny is by far the more favorable to the government. For one
thing, laws ordinarily are presumed constitutional. This presumption is
maintained under rational basis scrutiny, and therefore the claimant
must demonstrate that the law is not rationally or reasonably related to a
legitimate government interest.64 For another thing, this is an enor-
mously difficult task. Legitimate interests are many and omnipresent,
ranging from the traditional aspects of a state's police power (health,
welfare, safety, and morals) to the mundane needs of governmental ad-
60. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The holding and reasoning of City of
Boerne were most competently forecast by Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 39,
60-79 (1995). Constitutionally humbled, Congress eventually amended RFRA to conform to
the Court's holding. Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 7, 114 Stat. 803, 806 (Sept. 22, 2000).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc - 2000cc-5 (2001).
62. Id. §§ 2000cc(a)(1), 2000cc-l(a). The statute was recently upheld against an array of
constitutional challenges. Mayweathers v. Terhune, No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL
804140 (E.D. Cal. July 2, 2001). However, the district court's analysis of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, which undergirds some of the statute's provisions, failed to ad-
dress the issue of whether governmental burdening of religious practices can legitimately be
deemed economic or commercial, as United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561, 565-66 (1995),
appears to require. Mayweathers, 2001 WL 804140, at *8 (addressing only the existence of a
jurisdictional element).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a) defines institutionalized persons with reference to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997, which in turn defines "institution" as any state facility for the disabled, for prisoners,
for pretrial or juvenile detainees, or for those receiving various forms of care. Id. § 1997(1)
(1994).
64. Branson v. O.F. Mossberg & Sons, 221 F.3d 1064, 1065 n.4 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining
that under rational basis review "state statutes are presumed constitutional, and the plaintiff
has the burden to show otherwise").
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ministration (cost minimization and resource allocation). 65 Likewise, a
reasonable or rational relationship between a regulation's design and
one of these legitimate interests should be virtually impossible not to
articulate. To be sure, courts have generally shown a willingness at this
level of review to accept after-the-fact characterizations of a regulation's
objectives or internal logic, and in some instances have even been willing
to divine them on their own.6 6
This sharply contrasts with the rigors of strict scrutiny. Under this
standard, the evidentiary onus shifts to the government, requiring it to
demonstrate that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling govern-
ment interest. The presumption of constitutionality is extinguished, as is
the judiciary's willingness to assist the government in salvaging its regu-
latory handiwork.67 In addition, the elements of this test-what the gov-
ernment must now demonstrate-are appreciably more difficult to
satisfy. Compelling interests by definition comprise a much narrower set
of government objectives, 68 and regulations are seldom written or de-
signed so precisely as to make them "necessary" or the "least restrictive
means" to achieve the government's interest. Often there are alterna-
tive ways of accomplishing the same objective that would be less burden-
some to a claimant's religious practices, and a court's task under strict
scrutiny is essentially to hold the government to these less restrictive
alternatives.69
The conditions that can trigger strict scrutiny will be discussed
shortly. At this point, the focus will remain on satisfaction of the test
itself. Of its two parts-compelling interest and necessity or least re-
strictive means-the compelling interest requirement is, in general,
probably the easier to satisfy, except perhaps where the challenged regu-
lation is selectively aimed at religious practices.70 Health and safety, for
65. Scott C. Idleman, Why the State Must Subordinate Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION: A
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 175, 177 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
66. United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Under the rational basis
test, if there is a 'plausible reason[ ] for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end.' We need
not find that the legislature ever articulated this reason, nor that it actually underlay the legis-
lative decision, nor even that it was wise." (quoting United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 179 (1980))), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1005 (2000).
67. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Under the strict scrutiny standard,
we accord the classification no presumption of constitutionality."), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1127
(1994).
68. Idleman, supra note 65, at 177.
69. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 366-67; Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1558; cf.
State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 241-42 (Wis. 1996).
70. In such cases, the government faces at least two problems. First, the failure to extend
the law to comparable nonreligious activities undermines the notion that the law's objective is
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example, are often deemed compelling interests, 71 and many athletic
regulations are clearly rooted in health or safety concerns.7 2 In addition,
some courts have held that a state's interest in the regulation of high
school athletics, specifically the prevention of harmful recruiting prac-
tices through transfer ineligibility rules, is by itself compelling.73 Inter-
ests in cost reduction or administrative convenience are, by comparison,
less likely to be deemed compelling and, due to their empirical nature,
are also vulnerable to the corollary inquiry into least restrictive means.
That said, courts may be persuaded by administrative arguments which
overlap with their own institutional interest in keeping the scope of the
free exercise guarantee within manageable bounds. Thus, for example, a
demonstrable assertion that allowing a particular claimant to prevail
would effectively open the free exercise floodgates-either because of
the number of similarly situated potential claimants or because of an
inability to distinguish between genuine and insincere claims-may be
influential in the judicial scrutiny process.7 4 Finally, governments have
periodically tried to justify religiously burdensome rules, particularly
those that distinguish between religious and nonreligious participation or
expression, as efforts to comply with the Establishment Clause. In re-
cent years, however, as Establishment Clause doctrine has itself
compelling. If an interest is truly compelling, its achievement should be sought generally, not
selectively. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546-47; Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1557. Second, because
the law is not religiously neutral, the interest not only must generally compel the law as such,
but also must specifically compel the religious discrimination. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of
Police, 170 F.3d at 365 (rejecting governmental efforts to distinguish between medical exemp-
tions, which were provided, and religious exemptions, which were not).
71. See, e.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that "the
school district had a compelling interest in campus safety"); Brandon v. Board of Educ. of
Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting the state's "compelling
interest in public health, welfare, [and] morality"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981);
O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1007 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (upholding an
athletic drug testing program in light of "the compelling interest.., in protecting the health of
student-athletes").
72. See, e.g., Menora, 683 F.2d 1030 (addressing a state high school association's safety-
based ban on headwear among basketball players); Schools Get Right to the Point with Body
Piercing, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Feb. 8, 1999, at B10 (reporting that "[tlhe Ohio
High School Athletic Association prohibits jewelry of any kind, for safety reasons"), available
at 1999 WL 2348108; see also McGahey, supra note 9, at 163 (noting the potential validity of
certain safety regulations).
73. Walsh, 616 F.2d at 158-59; Cooper, 629 P.2d at 390.
74. Thomas C. Berg & Frank Myers, The Alabama Religious Freedom Amendment: An
Interpretive Guide, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 47, 77 (2000-2001) ("[Clourts will often consider
whether the claimant's behavior is of the kind that many people would like to engage in-that
is, whether the behavior coincides strongly with secular self-interest. If so, then granting one
exemption will likely require granting scores of others in order to be consistent, and will thus
be far more likely to undermine a law's basic purposes.").
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changed, courts have been increasingly less willing to accept such at-
tempted compliance as a compelling interest.75
The second inquiry asks whether the challenged rule is necessary or
narrowly tailored to the achievement of the government's interest, and
especially whether there is an equally efficacious alternative that is less
restrictive of the athlete's religious practices.76 Unlike the compelling
interest analysis, which tends to be legal and categorical, this inquiry is
heavily factual or empirical and will turn on the specific data, expert
testimony, and other evidence that the parties present to the court.77
Useful generalizations are therefore difficult to make. Nonetheless, it is
probably fair to say that, within this inquiry, aggressive claimants are
more likely to undermine the government's assertions and, correspond-
ingly, those assertions may be less likely to receive the deference of the
court.7 8
4. Causes of Heightened Judicial Scrutiny
Although some have argued that strict scrutiny within the free exer-
cise context is actually applied less rigorously than within other constitu-
tional contexts,79 nevertheless it is far more demanding than rational
75. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2103-07 (2001); Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993); Peter v. Wedl,
155 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise
Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND. LJ. 77, 97-98 (2000).
At present, there remain only a few areas in which the Establishment Clause imposes
special disabilities on religion which might provide a justification for exemptions. These
include prohibitions on government encouragement of or participation in religious
worship, on the delegation of governmental authority to religious organizations, and on
laws wholly lacking a plausible secular purpose.
Gedicks, supra, at 98.
76. In cases of non-neutrality, a court may also examine (under the narrow tailoring re-
quirement) the extent to which there is an equally effective alternative that is less discrimina-
tory towards the athlete's religious practices. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 546 (deeming it
problematic that the challenged ordinances were "in substantial respects" not only "over-
broad" or "achiev[able] by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree"
but also "underinclusive" or "not pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious conduct").
77. See, e.g., Walsh, 616 F.2d at 159.
78. Cf. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) (noting that legisla-
tive findings are not conclusive with regard to First Amendment compliance). Compare Ham-
ilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1554 n.10 (8th Cir. 1996) (explaining in a RFRA case that even
prison authorities, normally entitled to deference, "must do more than offer conclusory state-
ments and post hoc rationalizations for their conduct"), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 874 (1996), with
Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LrrrFn- RoCK L.J. 575,596 (1998) (contending
that the least restrictive means may have actually been the "most common instrument" by
which judges weakened RFRA's textually rigorous standard of review).
79. Idleman, supra note 65, at 180.
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basis scrutiny and should therefore be avoided unless absolutely neces-
sary. o To this end, the following is a somewhat closer examination of
the conditions that can trigger this heightened judicial scrutiny.81 It
should be noted at the outset, however, that the precise scope of these
conditions is presently unclear8 2 and lower courts, both state and federal,
are not uniform in either their interpretation or their application of
them.83
a. Lack of Neutrality
A governmental action will be subjected to strict scrutiny if it is not
religiously "neutral," that is, if its "object ... is to infringe upon or re-
strict practices because of their religious motivation .... ",s This neutral-
ity must exist not only among religions, but also "between religion and
non-religion."8 5 Most obviously, non-neutrality can inhere in a law or
policy as it is enacted. Thus, a court will look first and foremost at the
policy's wording,86 and if necessary at its breadth and structure, its ap-
parent objectives, the history and context of its enactment, and its in-
80. As the Smith Court remarked, "if 'compelling interest' really means what it says (and
watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many
laws will not meet the test." Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
81. There is an additional condition, not examined here, that can trigger strict scrutiny.
This is the judicially recognized "ministerial exception" to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Combs v. Central Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343, 348-51 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the exception triggers strict scrutiny even after
Smith); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same). The exception
relates to the employment of clergy and like personnel, however, and has no obvious relation
to student athletes at public educational institutions.
82. Kaplan, supra note 58, at 1046-47.
[T]he Smith opinion itself does not articulate clearly a test for determining what is a
neutral, generally applicable law, nor does it expressly clarify how narrowly or broadly
the Sherbert exception should be construed. At the same time, Smith offers no clear
indication of whether its reference to precedents that it describes as 'hybrid situations'
establishes an additional exception to Smith.
Id.
83. Id. at 1060-73 (cataloging the confusion).
84. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533; see also id. at 532 (explaining that "the protections of
the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious
beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons"). Con-
versely, "[a] law is neutral with respect to religion if it does not use religion as a basis of
classification-that is, if the religious character of the beliefs and practices of those to whom a
law applies is irrelevant to the goals of its classification scheme." Gedicks, supra note 75, at
96-97.
85. Hartmann, 68 F.3d at 978.
86. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533-34.
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tended and natural mode of operation. 7 Non-neutrality can also inhere
in the manner in which an otherwise neutral law or policy is applied, as
might occur with selective application in the absence of reviewably clear
standards of implementation (in which case the law may effectively lose
its general applicability, as well).88
Apart from instances where the government is attempting to avoid
an Establishment Clause violation, few laws or policies are enacted to-
day that expressly provide for, or otherwise have the object of, the ad-
verse treatment of religious practices."9 The more likely risk is that a
neutral law may be discriminatorily applied, particularly among religions
and especially against unpopular or unorthodox religious practices. Ath-
letic regulations, no less than other laws, can be constitutionally mishan-
dled in this way. Consider a regulation, rooted in safety, generally
banning the wearing of jewelry in a certain sport. Unless enacted specif-
ically to prevent athletes from wearing religious symbols, such as a cross
or a Star of David, the regulation will presumably be deemed neutral.
Consider, however, a coach's decision to allow Christian and Jewish
players to wear their symbols, but then not to allow a Wiccan player to
87. Id. at 534-35; Hyman, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 537-38; Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim Radin, Inc. v.
Village of New Hempstead, 98 F. Supp. 2d 347, 352-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Storm v. Town of
Woodstock, 32 F. Supp. 2d 520, 527 (N.D.N.Y.), affd, 165 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1998); see, e.g.,
Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 557 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a state crimi-
nal law was not religiously neutral where its prohibition applied "except as specifically permit-
ted by law" and there was no religion exception). These factors are similar to the factors used
to discern a legislative objective under the Equal Protection Clause, see City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. at 540, or "purpose" under the first prong of the Lemon test of the Establishment Clause.
See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,586-94 (1987); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41-42 (1980) (per curiam).
88. See, e.g., Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1554-55 (concluding that a university housing policy,
though "neutral on its face and in its purpose[,]" was not "being enforced in a neutral man-
ner" when it exempted over one-third of students for a variety of reasons but not religious
reasons and "when administrators base decisions upon their own religious experiences and
their own perceptions of the religious beliefs of others"); cf. Yeshiva Chofetz Chaim Radin, 98
F. Supp. 2d at 353; cf, e.g., Cosby v. State, 738 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (address-
ing, somewhat facetiously, the application of a facially neutral law).
89. "In fact, there are almost no cases in which an arm of the government has prohibited a
religious practice because it was a religious practice. The majority of cases deal with at least
ostensibly neutral laws." Hartmann, 68 F.3d at 979. Periodically, governmental entities, par-
ticularly in the educational setting, enact or implement policies concerning expression or ac-
cess to resources (such as funding or facilities) that explicitly discriminate on the basis of
religion, purportedly in an effort to comply with the Establishment Clause. However, such
regulations in recent years have generally been invalidated, often on free speech grounds. See,
e.g., Good News Club, 121 S. Ct. at 2099-2102 (after-hours access to school facilities); Rosen-
berger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-37 (1995) (funding for
student organizations); Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94 (after-hours access to school
facilities).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
wear a Wiccan symbol. If that should occur, and assuming no plausible
safety reason for distinguishing among the symbols, then the law's appli-
cation would invariably be deemed non-neutral and thus subject to strict
scrutiny.
b. Lack of General Applicability
A law will also be strictly scrutinized if it is selectively, as opposed to
generally, applicable. Applicability describes a law's breadth of cover-
age in relation to comparably situated persons or activities, and a gener-
ally applicable law, accordingly, is one that basically applies to all such
persons or activities, except where noncoverage either is necessary as a
matter of public safety or welfare or is congruent with the law's particu-
lar objectives.90 A highway speed limit, for example, is considered gen-
erally applicable, even though ambulances may be allowed to exceed it
to preserve life or health and even though police officers may be allowed
to exceed it in the process of apprehending speeders.
For free exercise purposes, the issue of general applicability is rele-
vant when a law appears to exempt from its coverage one or more non-
religious activities, persons, or institutions, but does not comparably
exempt those of a religious nature. More specifically, a reviewing court
will examine whether the nonexemption of religion is so unwarranted or
so aberrational that it may fairly be said that the "government... [has]
in a selective manner impose[d] burdens only on conduct motivated by
religious belief .... .,, Because "[a]ll laws are selective to some ex-
tent '' 92 the test is necessarily one of substantial underinclusiveness,93
wherein a court will carefully examine the effective scope of the law (the
90. Cf., e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 366 (explaining that heightened scrutiny
will not be triggered by statutory exceptions which "do[ ] not undermine the [government's]
interest" or which allow "activities that [the government] does not have an interest in prevent-
ing"). For additional analysis, see David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First
Amendment, 26 Sw. U. L. REv. 201 (1997); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long
Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 850 (2001).
91. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 543. Needless to say, "[n]eutrality and general applicabil-
ity are interrelated, and ... failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the
other has not been satisfied." Id. at 531. See also id. at 557-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) ("[C]ertainly a law that is not of general applicability.., can
be considered 'nonneutral'; and certainly no law that is nonneutral (in the relevant sense) can
be thought to be of general applicability."); Kaplan, supra note 58, at 1075 (proposing that,
because "the two inquiries overlap in many significant ways .... it is easier to collapse them
into a single test").
92. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 542.
93. Id. at 543, 546, 547.
[Vol. 12:295
2001] RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETE 315
"categories of selection" 94 ) and the precise justifications for that scope,
and determine whether or not the nonexemption of religion is "inconse-
quential."95 In assessing a law's effective scope, moreover, courts will
take into account not merely the exemptions expressly provided for in
the law, but also those comparable persons or activities that the law, by
its apparent silence, simply does not cover.96
For illustration, consider again a ban on the wearing of jewelry by
athletic competitors. If'the ban is absolute, with no categorical exemp-
tions and no room for discretionary administrative waivers, then it is
truly generally applicable. Alternatively, if the rule expressly exempts
from its coverage medical alert bracelets or medals, and especially if it
requires that they be securely fastened to the athlete, then the law would
still probably be deemed generally applicable, because the exemption is
not inconsistent with (and arguably furthers) the objective of the rule.
If, however, the rule expressly exempts medical alert bracelets or medals
as well as several other categories of jewelry, such as earrings and wed-
ding bands, but does not exempt religious jewelry, then a court might
find the rule to be non-generally applicable, especially if the non-medical
exemptions are incongruent with the rule's objective. It is perhaps out
of this very concern for general applicability that certain model athletic
rules issued by the National Federation of State High School Associa-
tions (NFHS), which otherwise would prohibit jewelry, expressly provide
exemptions for "[m]edical alert or religious medals" as long as they are
"taped to the body so as not to be a hazard to the player or others. '97
c. Exclusion from an Extant System of Individualized Assessment
Apart from the conditions of non-neutrality and selective applicabil-
ity, the occasions for invoking strict scrutiny are less defined. One possi-
94. Id. at 542.
95. Id. at 543. See, e.g., id. at 543-45 (finding that municipal ordinances prohibiting ritual-
istic or sacrificial animal slaughter were not generally applicable when, by their text and con-
text, it remained lawful to, among other things, exterminate mice and rats, euthanize animals,
hunt and fish, and kill animals for agricultural or food purposes); Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1553
(finding that a state university rule, requiring freshman to live in university housing, was not
generally applicable where "exceptions are granted... for a variety of non-religious reasons
... [but] are not granted for religious reasons" and, because of the exceptions, "[o]ver one
third of the freshman students... are not required to comply with the parietal rule").
96. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 543-44 (assessing the applicability of ordinances by citing
the activities that the ordinances' narrow drafting leaves unprohibited).
97. E.g., NAT'L FED'N OF STATE HIGH ScH. Ass'Ns, Boys LACROSSE RuLEs BOOK, rule
1-10-2 (2001-2002) ("Jewelry is not permitted. Medical alert or religious medals, if worn, shall
be taped to the body so as not to be a hazard to the player or others."), available at http://
www.nfhs.org/sports/lacrosseboysrules,_change.htm.
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bility, noted but not thoroughly explained by the Supreme Court, is that
strict scrutiny may apply "where the [government] has in place a system
of individual exemptions" but "refuse[s] to extend that system to cases
of 'religious hardship[.]' 91 More specifically, strict scrutiny may apply if
the regulation, by its terms or actual implementation, "len[ds] itself to
individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the ... con-
duct"99 for which the claimant seeks an exemption, but the government
categorically refuses to consider religious beliefs or practices as a poten-
tial basis of exemption.10 0 Importantly, strict scrutiny in such cases is
triggered not by the refusal of the religious exemption per se, but rather
by the government's blanket refusal to consider religion as a possible
reason for an exemption. 101
This condition would seem to overlap significantly with the condition
of selective or non-general applicability, leading some courts to analyze
them together. 02 The difference appears to concern the mode, and per-
haps the degree, of non-applicability. The inquiry into general applica-
bility examines the enumerated exceptions, if any, provided for in the
statute, whereas the inquiry into individual assessment examines the ex-
istence of some discretionary device, such as a "good cause" or
"[ ]necess[ity]" or "exceptional circumstances" standard, 10 3 that the gov-
98. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (plurality
opinion)).
99. Id. See also Swanson by Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694,
701-02 (10th Cir. 1998); Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1552-53.
100. Although the Court has spoken of this condition almost entirely in relation to unem-
ployment compensation cases, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-84; Swanson, 135 F.3d at 701 (noting
"some doubt concerning the continued validity of the.., analysis outside the unemployment
context"), the Court has not explicitly limited its relevance to that context. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. at 537 (invoking it in a case involving municipal animal slaughter ordinances); Rader,
924 F. Supp. at 1552 n.23 ("Whether individualized exemptions constitute an exception to the
Smith rule or merely preclude a finding of general applicability.... I see no justifiable basis
for limiting consideration of them to only those cases involving unemployment
compensation.").
101. Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory
of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 Mo. L. REV.
9, 50-51 (2001) (explaining that the Court in Smith did not "mean[ ] that any refusal to exempt
a person for reasons of religious hardship must be measured by strict scrutiny" but rather that
"the categorical refusal to give any consideration to religious hardship whatsoever, while giv-
ing consideration to non-religious reasons for seeking an exemption, triggers strict scrutiny").
102. Kaplan, supra note 58, at 1062 (observing that some "courts conflate the 'generally
applicable' inquiry with the 'individualized exemptions' analysis").
103. Respectively, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (discussing the "good cause" standard in the
unemployment compensation context); City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 537 (analyzing a municipal
ordinance prohibiting one from "unnecessarily" killing animals); Rader, 924 F. Supp. at 1546-
47 (addressing a university policy requiring that freshman live on-campus which provided for
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einment uses on a case-by-case basis to determine whether an individual
should be excused from the statute's otherwise general application.104 In
fact, while this condition may superficially appear closer to non-general
applicability, it is equally if not more related to non-neutrality (at least
non-neutrality at the stage of implementation).' If the government has
in place an open-ended mechanism for assessing individual hardship and
employs this mechanism to assess secular reasons but refuses to employ
it to assess religious reasons-"when the government makes a value
judgment in favor of secular motivations, but not religious motiva-
tions"'° 6 -then what else, other than religious discrimination or non-
neutrality, could explain the government's execution of the law?"°7
The potential relevance of this condition to any given athletic regula-
tion will obviously depend on the regulation's wording and history of
implementation. If the regulation expressly provides for its waiver upon
some showing, such as good cause or exceptional circumstances, then
athletes cannot categorically be denied the opportunity to assert relig-
ious reasons for seeking a waiver. Thus, for example, if medical condi-
tions or family problems constitute recognized grounds for a waiver,
then religious circumstances must also be considered. As noted earlier,
the Free Exercise Clause does not necessarily require the waiver itself,
but it does require assessment of religious reasons in the process con-
templating waivers. Likewise, if the regulation contains no express pro-
vision for waiver, but nevertheless there is an informal practice of
granting waivers in circumstances deemed appropriate, then this practice
must include the consideration of religious and nonreligious reasons
alike.10 8
discretionary exemptions, such as medical or family-related matters, based on a showing of
"significant and truly exceptional circumstances which would make living on-campus
impossible").
104. Cf Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 365 (distinguishing between "a mechanism
for individualized exemptions" and "a categorical exemption for individuals with a secular
objection but not for individuals with a religious objection").
105. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 537-38 (invoking this condition within an analysis of
neutrality, analyzing the application of a municipal ordinance).
106. Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 366.
107. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708 (explaining that, "[i]f a state creates... a mechanism [for
individual exemptions by using a good cause standard], its refusal to extend an exemption to
an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent" and that for the state "to
consider a religiously motivated resignation to be 'without good cause' tends to exhibit hostil-
ity, not neutrality, towards religion").
108. Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 365-67 (holding that a police department's no-
beard rule, to which an exception had been made for medical conditions, could not be applied
without like consideration of religious objections, and ultimately that an exemption was
required).
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d. Assertion of a Hybrid Claim
A final possible condition for triggering heightened scrutiny is the
claimant's assertion of a free exercise claim in conjunction with another
constitutional claim,1 °9 although what level of scrutiny is actually trig-
gered by such a "hybrid situation" 110 remains uncertain.' At present,
the judiciary is deeply divided over the meaning, and even the existence,
of this particular concept." 2 While a few courts have basically repudi-
ated it, 113 most others have wrestled with the issues of what types of
accompanying, or "conjunctive," claims will qualify and how viable these
claims must be.' 14
As for what types of claims will suffice, the Supreme Court itself has
explicitly identified "freedom of speech and of the press,.., the right of
parents ... to direct the education of their children""' 5 and possibly
109. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. For commentary, see William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious
Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 211 (1998); Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Prove-
nance and Progeny of the "Hybrid Situation" in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 833 (1993); Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights Doc-
trine in Free Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119 (2000); James R. Mason, III, Comment,
Smith's Free-Exercise "Hybrids" Rooted in Non-Free-Exercise Soil, 6 REGENT U. L. REV. 201
(1995).
110. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
111. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Village of Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 561-62 (6th Cir.
2001) (holding that hybrid rights, even speech and religion, do not trigger strict scrutiny), cert.
granted in part, 122 S. Ct. 392 (2001); Church at 925 S. 18th St. v. Employment Dep't, 28 P.3d
1185, 1192 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) ("Strictly speaking, the [Smith] Court did not say that, in any
particular class of cases, a neutral, generally applicable law will be subject to strict scrutiny. It
simply noted-without reference to any particular standard-that, in the past, the Court had
struck down neutral, generally applicable laws when a case 'involved' both the Free Exercise
Clause and some other constitutional protection.").
112. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 704-07 (9th Cir. 1999)
(canvassing the problem), withdrawn by 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999); City Chapel Evangeli-
cal Free, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, Ind., 744 N.E.2d 443, 452, 452-53 nn.11-12 (Ind. 2001) (noting
federal and state court interpretations of the hybrid claim concept).
113. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Board of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180 & n.1 (6th Cir. 1993); Warner v.
City of Boca Raton, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1288 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (questioning whether it "is
tenable").
114. This article will use the term conjunctive claim to describe the claim asserted along
with free exercise to constitute the hybridized claim. Others have employed varying terms.
See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) ("companion right") (quoting
Thomas, 165 F.3d at 703); Kaplan, supra note 58, at 1069 n.107 ("conjoined constitutional
claim"). In all events, both the free exercise claim and the conjunctive claim must presumably
be leveled against the same law or governmental conduct, and their mere presence together in
the same lawsuit would not be sufficient.
115. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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"freedom of association," '116 but has not clearly indicated whether this
enumeration is exclusive or merely illustrative.1 7 Although some lower
courts have expressed reluctance to extend the hybrid rights concept be-
yond these enumerated claims, 18 others have been willing to entertain
the hybridization of free exercise with constitutional guarantees relating
to the nonestablishment of religion,11 9 the rights of property,120 and the
right to life, 1 though even they have drawn the line at the infamous
"right to employ" of Lochner v. New York."
This issue of defining the domain of potential conjunctive claims fun-
damentally concerns the coherence and administrability of the hybrid
rights concept itself. Certainly, it cannot be the case that litigants may
simply add to their free exercise claims one or more garden variety con-
stitutional claims, each of which would ordinarily prompt only rational
basis review, and expect that strict scrutiny will alchemically result from
the blend. If nothing else, the omnipresence of potential due process
and equal protection claims, normally requiring only rational basis re-
view, reveals the unmanageability of such an approach." But the alter-
native-to recognize only conjunctive claims that independently trigger
heightened scrutiny-would seem to empty the hybrid rights concept of
116. Id. at 882; City Chapel, 744 N.E.2d at 454 (entertaining the possibility of a hybrid free
association-free exercise claim).
117. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (finding no hybrid situation, and declining to apply strict scru-
tiny, where the free exercise claim was "unconnected with any communicative activity or pa-
rental right" and there was "no contention that [the challenged law] represents an attempt to
regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's chil-
dren in those beliefs" but not explicitly stating that other constitutional claims could not also
suffice).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Carlson, No. 90-10465, 1992 WL 64772, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr.
2, 1992) ("It is questionable whether an equal protection claim can satisfy the hybrid claim
requirements of Smith."), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1227 (1992); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp.
1537, 1547 n.11 (D. Utah 1992) (concluding that claims not involving communicative activity
or parental rights "go beyond the formulation of the 'hybrid rights' exception established...
in Smith").
119. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d at 467 (explaining in dictum that governmental inter-
ference with religious university employment "presents the kind of 'hybrid situation' referred
to in Smith" because it "would both burden [the university's] right of free exercise and exces-
sively entangle the Government in religion").
120. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 707-09.
121. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1030-31 (E.D. Va. 1993), affid, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 825 (1994).
122. American Friends Serv. Communication Corp. v. Thornburgh, 951 F.2d 957, 960 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("At least since the demise of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the 'right to
employ' has been accorded insufficient constitutional protection to place it alongside the cases
Smith cites as examples of 'hybrid claims."').
123. Kaplan, supra note 58, at 1067 (suggesting that "a very broad interpretation of the
hybrid rights exception" by courts "destabilize[s], if not eviscerate[s], the holding of Smith").
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any significance. If the conjunctive claim on its own would lead to
heightened or strict scrutiny, then the presence of the free exercise claim
adds nothing, and there really is no hybridization after all.124 Arguably,
the only clear application for the concept is for conjunctive claims that
by themselves trigger some form of intermediate scrutiny (more than
rational basis but less than strict), whereby hybridization could plausibly
increase the level of review to strict scrutiny. But the intermediate scru-
tiny standard is relatively uncommon, 125 and opportunities to invoke the
hybrid rights concept would, as a consequence, be proportionately infre-
quent, although perhaps this is precisely what the Supreme Court
intended.126
Yet another uncertainty, regardless of how one defines the domain of
potential conjunctive claims, is the extent to which the conjunctive claim
must be legally viable. Obviously it cannot be legally frivolous. As the
D.C. Circuit remarked of an attempt to assert a hybridized free exercise-
free speech claim, where neither of the underlying claims had any merit,
"in law as in mathematics zero plus zero equals zero."'1 27 Just as plainly,
however, courts cannot require that the conjunctive claim be demon-
strated to be definitively successful, for then the free exercise claim and
the resulting strict scrutiny become an unnecessary postscript. Accord-
ingly, several courts have adopted what is perceived to be an intermedi-
ate position: the conjunctive claim must be shown to be "colorable,"12
that is, having "a fair probability or a likelihood, but not a certitude, of
success on the merits."'129 In addition to, or as part of, this colorability
showing, courts have also generally required that the conjunctive claim
fall within the specific, precedentially-defined parameters of an existing
constitutional right. 3 ' Regarding the parental right to direct a child's
education, for example, the Tenth Circuit requires "a colorable showing
124. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (gender discrimination);
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995) (commercial speech); Sup. Ct. of
Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 65 (1988) (residency discrimination under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (ille-
gitimacy); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (content-neutral regulations of
expression).
126. Kaplan, supra note 58, at 1083-84 ("To ensure that hybrid rights cases remain within
the parameters established in Smith, the exception must be construed extremely narrowly.").
127. Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
128. See, e.g., Miller, 176 F.3d at 1207-08; Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700.
129. Miller, 176 F.3d at 1207.
130. See, e.g., id. at 1208; Swanson, 135 F.3d at 699-700; Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of
Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 1991).
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of infringement of recognized and specific constitutional rights, rather
than the mere invocation of a general right such as the right to control
the education of one's child."' 31
As for the relationship between hybrid challenges and athletic regu-
lations, there is, as they say, both good news and bad news. The bad
news is that there is little that administrators can do prospectively to
ward off potential hybrid claims. Unlike the other conditions, strict scru-
tiny is triggered in this instance not because of an intrinsic regulatory
defect, such as non-neutrality or selective applicability, but because of an
extrinsic convergence of two constitutional rights, one of which happens
to be the free exercise of religion. Thus, administrators must basically
wait for such challenges to arise and then decide whether to accommo-
date or to adjudicate the conflict. The good news is that such challenges
are likely to be infrequent, mostly limited to conjunctive claims based on
freedom of speech and possibly freedom of association, such as chal-
lenges to incidental restrictions on prayer, evangelization, or the wearing
of religious clothing or symbols.'32 Indeed, even if the range of conjunc-
tive claims is broad, extending beyond those acknowledged by the Su-
preme Court, it is difficult to envision their relevance within the specific
context of interscholastic athletics.'3 3
5. Forms of Accommodation-Mandatory and Permissible
If the regulation fails judicial scrutiny, the court will require by in-
junction that the defendant accommodate the religious practice of the
athlete. Ordinarily, the regulation as a whole will remain constitution-
131. Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700; see also Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d
525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding against hybridization because the parents' free exercise claim
was "qualitatively distinguishable" from precedent), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996).
132. Assertions of parental rights, though often implicated within the educational context,
would likely not survive the requirement (noted above) that a claim be well within existing
precedent. See, e.g., Kite, 661 F.2d at 1029-30 (rejecting a claim of parental right "to send their
children to summer [collegiate] athletic camps"); Eastern N.Y. Youth Soccer Ass'n v. New
York State Pub. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 488 N.Y.S.2d 293,295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (hold-
ing that parental rights encompass a student's decision to participate in athletics but do not
extend to the regulation of athletics), affd, 490 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1986); Eric W. Schuze,
Commentary, The Constitutional Right of Parents to Direct the Education of Their Children,
138 EDUc. L. REP. 583, 593 (1999) (discussing Kite). But see infra notes 200-02 and accompa-
nying text (exploring the viability of certain hybrid claims by home-schooling parents).
133. This is not to deny the relevance of other constitutional provisions to interscholastic
athletics. 2 LAW oF PRoFEssIoNAL AND AMAT'EUR SPORTS § 11.03[5] (Gary A. Uberstine ed.,
2000) (noting several constitutional limitations). But within the athletic venue, it is difficult to
imagine a convergence of most such provisions, other than the Free Speech Clause, with the
free exercise of religion.
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ally valid, but as applied to the claimant's religious practice, under the
facts presented to the court, it will be declared violative of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. In such a case, the result is one of judicially compelled or
mandatory accommodation, subsequent denial of which by the defen-
dant can result in a declaration of contempt of court subject to monetary
penalty.
If so inclined, governmental entities may avoid the cost and publicity
associated with a lawsuit seeking court-compelled accommodation by
voluntarily accommodating an athlete's religious practice. Called discre-
tionary or permissible accommodation, this method has been explicitly
sanctioned by the Supreme Court134 and can be prospectively employed
by educational institutions to "avoid[ ] conflicts between [the] secular
and religious activities" of their students. 135 The only specific qualifica-
tion to the method of permissible accommodation is that it must abide
by certain limits imposed by the Establishment Clause, 136 although these
limits appear to be somewhat relaxed where the government is genuinely
attempting to accommodate religious practices. 137 In particular, while a
134. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705-06 (recognizing that "the Constitution allows the State to
accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens"); Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (ac-
knowledging legislative accommodation); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987).
135. Student Members of Playcrafters v. Board of Educ., 424 A.2d 1192, 1198 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div.) (explaining that "permissible accommodations to religion can take the form of
avoiding conflicts between secular and religious activities"), affd, 438 A.2d 543 (N.J. 1981).
When the state ... cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of
public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then re-
spects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their
spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a require-
ment that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
136. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 696-705 (invalidating a state statute uniquely enacted for "a
group defined by its character as a religious community, in a legal and historical context that
gives no assurance that governmental power has been or will be exercised neutrally"); Estate
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708-11 (1985) (invalidating a state statute that
"arm[ed] Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified right not to work on whatever
day they designate as their Sabbath"); Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc.,
224 F.3d 283, 287-88 (4th Cir. 2000) (expounding "[t]he line between benevolent neutrality
and permissible accommodation, on the one hand, and improper sponsorship or interference,
on the other"), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1192 (2001); Conkle, supra note 38, at 12-13 (noting
limitations on permissible accommodations).
137. See, e.g., Ehlers-Renzi, 224 F.3d at 287 (explaining that "the government is entitled to
accommodate religion without violating the Establishment Clause, and at times the govern-
ment must do so" and that "[t]his authorized ... accommodation of religion is a necessary
aspect of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence because, without it, government would find
itself effectively and unconstitutionally promoting the absence of religion over its practice");
Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d 844, 850 n.10 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[S]tates might commit a tech-
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discretionary accommodation may be either informal (a one-time nonap-
plication of the rule) or formal (the inclusion and application of an ex-
press exception to the rule for religious practices), the Supreme Court
has suggested that the latter method is constitutionally preferable be-
cause it reduces the likelihood of non-neutrality or discrimination among
religious practices. 3 '
B. Other Sources of Legal Protection
Although the Free Exercise Clause is perhaps the best known guar-
antee of religious liberty, several other laws may be equally or more rel-
evant to conflicts between the religious beliefs or practices of
interscholastic athletes and the rules or policies enacted or enforced by
coaches, administrators, or athletic associations. First of all, there are
other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. The Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, for example, prohibits a variety of governmental
interactions with religion,13 9 and in some instances may present distinct
nical violation of the Establishment Clause by even hiring prison chaplains. Nonetheless, this
is condoned as a permissible accommodation for persons whose free exercise rights would
otherwise suffer."); cf. Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., Eaton County, 365 N.W.2d 151,
162-68 (Mich. 1984) (holding that public school classes can be provided to religious school
students without violating the Establishment Clause).
138. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 702-05.
139. As interpreted today, the Clause prohibits governmental laws, policies, or actions:
(1) that have no secular purpose, Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589-94; Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42; Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), or that have the purpose of advancing or inhibiting
religion, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); or (2) that have the primary effect of advancing or inhib-
iting religion, Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612, or of objectively endorsing or
disapproving of religion, Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-
69 (1995); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989); Elewski v. City of
Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1004 (1998); or (3) that
create excessive entanglement between government and religion, Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232-33;
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); or (4) that coerce religious participation, either by
legal sanction, Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 476-80 (7th Cir. 1996); Griffen v. Coughlin, 673
N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1054 (1997); Warner v. Orange County Dep't of
Probation, 870 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), or by psychological pressure, Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist., 530 U.S. at 311-12; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,591-98 (1992); or (5) that discriminate
among religious beliefs or practices, Grumet, 512 U.S. at 703; Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,
244-46 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1999), or between
religious beliefs or practices and nonreligious beliefs or practices. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 703;
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103-04. Having recited the litany, it is important to add that there are
qualified exceptions for longstanding, culturally imbedded practices, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 674 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,795 (1983); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d
982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997), and for government attempts to
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advantages to would-be claimants. 4 ' In addition, abridgement of relig-
ious expression is likely limited by the First Amendment Free Speech
Clause, 41 while religious discrimination is potentially actionable under
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.142
Alternative or heightened protection may also be afforded by federal
statutory law. For instance, the relatively potent RFRA, 143 which em-
accommodate the religious needs of its citizens. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying
text.
140. For one thing, the Establishment Clause normally does not demand the type or de-
gree of personal religious infringement that the Free Exercise Clause requires, Schempp, 374
U.S. at 224 n.9. although for this very reason claimants may lack the personal factual injury
necessary to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of standing. See, e.g., ACLU-NJ v. Town-
ship of Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 264-66 (3d Cir. 2001); Freedom from Religion Found. v. Zielke, 845
F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (7th Cir. 1988). For another thing, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which
judicially functions by balancing the relative interests of the parties, the Establishment Clause
for the most part operates categorically: with one exception, once any of its proscriptions is
transgressed, the offending government action becomes irredeemably and universally uncon-
stitutional, no matter how compelling its objectives or well-tailored its means. Church of
Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1539 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 807 (1994); Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Dunn, 384 F.
Supp. 714, 718 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. Blanton v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 421 U.S. 958 (1975). The exception is
for facial religious discrimination, which is instead subject to strict scrutiny. Larson, 456 U.S.
at 246-47; Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118
(2000).
141. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech .... "). Like the religion clauses, the Free Speech Clause applies to state and local
governments via the Fourteenth Amendment. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277
(1964). Many religious practices, particularly those related to worship, are intentionally and
intelligibly expressive or communicative; they deliberately convey particularized messages to
God, to other practitioners, or to outsiders. In turn, they may warrant protection under the
Free Speech Clause. In particular, discrimination against religious speech, at least within
some type of public forum, is generally treated as violating the Clause's norm of content- or
viewpoint-neutrality and, as such, is subjected to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Good News Club,
121 S. Ct. at 2099-2102; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-37. For a more complete exposition of
current law, see the U.S. Secretary of Education's Guidelines on Religious Expression in Pub-
lic Schools (rev. May 1998), available at http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion.html.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[No State shall] deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws."). A parallel and identical guarantee of equal protec-
tion has been read, rather mysteriously, into the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215 (1995). Under the guarantee of equal
protection, religious discrimination is apparently subject to heightened scrutiny. Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(per curiam); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992); Peter, 155 F.3d at 997;
Tolchin v. Supreme Ct. of the State of N.J., 111 F.3d 1099, 1113-14 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
522 U.S. 977 (1997); But cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 n.14 (1971) (suggesting
the contrary). Insofar as such discrimination is clearly prohibited by the religion clauses, how-
ever, the Equal Protection Clause appears to add nothing unique to the constitutional mix.
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4 (1994).
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ploys a strict scrutiny standard, can apply to the educational institutions
of the United States government (such as the military academies) as well
as to those of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. 1" Importantly,
however, there appears to be no general federal statute that explicitly
protects the religious freedom of amateur athletes at educational
institutions. 45
Yet another source of protection can be state law, whether constitu-
tional, statutory, or administrative. State constitutions, for example, typ-
144. Id. § 2000bb-2(1)-(2) (providing that RFRA applies to any "branch, department,
agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United
States" and to "the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each terri-
tory and possession of the United States"). RFRA's application to state and local govern-
ments, expressly included in the original version, was invalidated in City of Boerne, 521 U.S.
507. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding City of Boerne, which rested
largely on lack-of-congressional-power grounds, RFRA apparently remains valid as applied to
the federal government. Kikumura, 242 F.3d at 958-60; Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church (In re Young), 141 F.3d 854, 858-61 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811 (1998).
But cf. Henderson, 253 F.3d at 16 (questioning, though not determining, RFRA's constitution-
ality in relation to the federal government); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act Is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (1998) (arguing that RFRA is
unconstitutional as applied to federal law); Edward J.W. Blatnik, Note, No RFRAFAllowed:
The Status of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's Federal Application in the Wake of City
of Boerne v. Flores, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1998) (same).
145. In general, private entities are subject to federal statutory requirements regarding
religious nondiscrimination or accommodation when acting as employers, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1994), or holding themselves out to the public in general as, for example, places of ac-
commodation or as sellers or lessors of property. See id. § 3604(a)-(e). None of these rela-
tionships obviously pertains to the amateur student athlete, however. But cf. Kristi L.
Schoepfer, Comment, Title VII: An Alternative Remedy for Gender Inequity in Intercollegiate
Athletics, 11 MAR. SPORTS L. REv. 107 (2000); and cf. Thomas Joshua R. Archer, The Struc-
ture of a Title VII Action Against a College for the Enforcement of NCAA Proposition 48, 2
SPORTS LAW. J. 111 (1995). In addition, while schools can be subject to nondiscrimination
requirements as direct or indirect recipients of federal funding, these requirements extend to
gender, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994), to disability, id. §§ 794(a), 794(b)(2)(A), and to race,
color, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 100 (2000), but not to religion.
Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994) could conceivably cover certain conspiratorial depriva-
tions of free exercise, see LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 426-27 (2d Cir. 1995),
but it is unlikely that the promulgation or enforcement of an ordinary athletic rule, without
more, would violate this statute. Nor would such promulgation or enforcement likely be
deemed an attempt to "intentionally obstruct[ ], by force or threat of force, any person in the
enjoyment of that person's free exercise of religious beliefs .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2).
Lastly, while the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act prohibits its recognized ama-
teur sports organizations from discriminating on the basis of religion, 36 U.S.C.
§ 220522(a)(8), these organizations are regulatorily distinct from primary, secondary, or
higher educational athletic programs. And it is unlikely, in all events, that there is an implied
right of action for religious discrimination under the statute. Cf. Sternberg v. U.S.A. Nat'l
Karate-Do Fed'n, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 659,666 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (recognizing only "[a] narrow
right of action regarding sex discrimination").
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ically have counterparts to the federal religion clauses,14 6 and while some
are textually quite similar to the First Amendment, 147 many contain lan-
guage or traditions indicating greater coverage than the federal provi-
sions.1 48 Several state constitutions may also have additional clauses
governing specific interactions between religion and government within
the educational context 149 or may, by judicial interpretation, even secure
a right to participate in interscholastic athletics. 50 In recent years,
largely due to RFRA's inapplicability to state and local governments, 15 1
146. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4; ARIZ. CONST. art. II,
§ 12; ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 24-26; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4, CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 3 & art. VII; DEL. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-2; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST.
art. I, § 1, paras. III-IV & § 2, para. VII; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 3; IND. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-7; IOWA CONST. art. I, §§ 3-4; KAN. CONST. BILL OF
RTS. § 7; Ky. CONsT. BILL OF RTS. § 5; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; ME. CONST. art. I, § 3; MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RTS. arts. 36-37; MASS. CONST. Pt. I, arts. II-II & amend. art. 46; MICH.
CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 18; MINN. CONST. art. I, §§ 16-17; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 18; Mo. CONST.
art. I, §§ 5-7; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 5; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 4; N.H.
CONST. pt. I, arts. 4-6; N.J. CONST. art. I, par. 3-4; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 11; N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 3; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 7 & art. VIII, § 3;
OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 & art. II, § 5; OR. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2-6; PA. CONsT. art. I, §§ 3-4; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 3; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. I, §§ 3-4;
TEx. CONST. art. I, §§ 4-7; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 3; VA. CONST. art. I,
§ 16 & art. III, § 11; WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 11; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 15; Wis. CONST. art. I,
§§ 18-19; WYo. CONST. art. I, §§ 18-19 & art. XXI, § 25.
147. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 4; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8;
MorNT. CONST. art. II, § 5.
148. See, e.g., City Chapel Evangelical Free, 744 N.E.2d at 446 (per Dickson, J., joined by
Rucker, J.) ("[r]eject[ing] the contention that the Indiana Constitution's guarantees of relig-
ious protection should be equated with those of its federal counterpart and that federal juris-
prudence therefore governs the interpretation of our state guarantees"); Humphrey v. Lane,
728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043-45, 1044 (Ohio 2000) (concluding that the phrasing of OHIO CONST. art.
I, § 7 is "broader than that which proscribes any law prohibiting free exercise of religion");
Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. 2000) (noting that "the language of
[TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3], when compared to the guarantee of religious freedom contained in
the federal constitution, is a stronger guarantee of religious freedom"); Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280-81 (Alaska 1994) (recognizing independent analysis
under ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 4), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 979 (1994); Kentucky State Bd. of
Elementary & Secondary Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877, 879-81 (Ky. 1979) (interpreting
Ky. CONST. art. I, § 5), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); see generally Neil McCabe, The State
and Federal Religion Clauses: Differences of Degree and Kind, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 49
(1992).
149. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. I, §§ 23-24 & art. X, § 3.
150. See, e.g., Kaptein by Kaptein v. Conrad Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d 1311, 1316 (Mont. 1997)
(holding that the right to participate in extracurricular activities, including athletics, is pro-
tected under the Montana Constitution); Duffley v. New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, 446 A.2d 462, 467 (N.H. 1982) (holding that "the right of a student to participate in
interscholastic athletics is one that is entitled to the protections of procedural due process
under [N.H. CONST.] pt. I, art. 15").
151. See supra notes 60, 144.
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many states have recognized a level of state constitutional protection for
religious practices above that of the First Amendment, either by state
constitutional amendment152 or by judicial interpretation of an existing
state constitutional provision.153 In most instances, these newly added or
interpreted state constitutional provisions provide (as did RFRA) that
even neutral and generally applicable laws, if they impose a substantial
burden on a religious practice, will be subject to a standard of strict scru-
tiny similar to that found vestigially under the First Amendment.
State law also may protect the religious practices of athletes by stat-
ute or regulation. 54 As an alternative to state constitutional revision,
for example, many states have enacted their own religious freedom res-
toration acts that, also like RFRA, impose strict or heightened judicial
scrutiny on the laws and policies of state and local government, even
those which are neutral and generally applicable. 55 Furthermore, sev-
eral states have statutory anti-religious discrimination provisions that ap-
ply generally to their educational institutions156 or specifically to their
152. ALA. CONST. amend. No. 622.
153. City Chapel Evangelical Free, 744 N.E.2d at 445-51 (interpreting IND. CONST. art. I,
§§ 2-4); Humphrey, 728 N.E.2d at 1043-45 (interpreting OHIo CONST. art. I, § 7); Munns v.
Martin, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (Wash. 1997) (interpreting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11); State v.
Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 239-41 (Wis. 1996) (interpreting Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18); Hunt v.
Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Vt. 1994) (interpreting VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 3); Attorney Gen. v.
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235-36 (Mass. 1994) (interpreting MASS. CONsT. amend, art. 46, § 1);
Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280-84 (interpreting ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4); St. John's Lutheran
Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271, 1276-77 (Mont. 1992) (interpreting MONT.
CONsT. art. II, § 5); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-99 (Minn. 1990) (interpreting
MwNN. CoNsT. art. I, § 16). See generally Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Re-
consider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment
Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 1017 (1994); Stuart G. Parsell, Note, Revitalization of the
Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment Division v.
Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 747 (1993).
154. See generally Thomas C. Berg, State Religious Freedom Statutes in Private and Public
Education, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 531 (1999).
155. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §8 41-1493 to 41-1493.02 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-571b (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 761.01-.05 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE §§ 73-
401 to 73-404 (Michie 2000); 775 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 35/1-35/99 (2000); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §H 28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (Michie 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. H3 51-251 to 51-258 (West 2001);
R.I. GEN. LAws §8 42-80.1-1 to 42.80.1-4 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-32-10 to 1-32-60 (Law
Co-op 2001); TEX. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE 8H 110.001-.012 (2000). Additional compilations
of these state provisions can be found at EUGENE VOLOKH, Tim FiRsT AiMNDMEN:. LAW,
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND PoLicY ARGUMENTrs 925 (2001); Angela C. Carmella, State Constitu-
tional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L.
REv. 275,305-19; Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in
the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 235, 245-47 nn.71-79 (1998); Douglas Laycock, The
Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 44 nn.81-84 (2000).
156. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 106.58 (West 2001) ("No child may be excluded from or
discriminated against.., in obtaining the advantages, privileges and courses of study of [any]
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athletic programs,'57 although incidental burdens on religious practices
may or may not be considered actionable discrimination under these
provisions. In addition, a few states explicitly protect students' religious
speech (including prayer, viewpoint expression, and distribution of relig-
ious literature), 158 and at least one state specifically safeguards the abil-
ity of "members of athletic teams at any public elementary and
secondary school ... [to] engag[e] in voluntary, student-initiated, stu-
dent-led prayer."' 59
Student-athletes' religious practices may likewise find protection
under the laws or rules of their particular municipality, county, school
board or corporation, college or university, or interscholastic or intercol-
legiate athletic association. The National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA), for example, has a policy of accommodating religious
institutions that foresee a conflict between a scheduled championship
competition and the religious observances of the institution's student-
athletes.16 ° The NCAA has also exempted brief religious observances by
public school on account of ... religion...."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.13(1) (West 2001) ("No
person may be denied participation ...in, be denied the benefits of or be discriminated
against in any [public school] curricular, extracurricular, pupil services, recreational or other
program or activity because of the person's ... religion ... [or] creed .... ).
157. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 4920 (2001) ("No person shall on the basis of...
religion ... be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be denied equivalent
opportunity in, or otherwise discriminated against in interscholastic, intramural, or club athlet-
ics."); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6C2-4.018 art. II(1)(b) (2000) (prohibiting Florida State
University from "[1]imit[ing] ... participation in educational, athletic, social, cultural, or other
activities of the University because of... religion"); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 4-1.5(f) (2001)
("The athletic program, including but not limited to intramural, extramural, and inter-scholas-
tic sports, shall be available on an equal basis to all students regardless of ... creed [or]
religion .... ); see also D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 5, § 2700.3 (2001) ("Students shall not be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of be treated differently from other stu-
dents, or otherwise be unlawfully discriminated against in interscholastic athletics, for any
reason, including but not limited to... religion ....").
158. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.183 (Banks-Baldwin 2001); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6-2904 (2001).
159. LA. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2115.8 (2000).
160. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 2001-02 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art.
31.1.4.1 (2001), available at https://goomer.ncaa.org/wdbctx/LSDBi/LSDBI.home.
If a participating institution has a written policy against competition on a particular day
for religious reasons, it shall submit its written policy to the governing sports committee
on or before September 1 of each academic year in order for it or one of its student-
athletes to be excused from competing on that day. The championship schedule shall be
adjusted to accommodate that institution, and such adjustment shall not require its
team or an individual competitor to compete prior to the time originally scheduled.
Id. In recent years, this policy, known as the BYU Rule, has been the source of some contro-
versy. A 1998 amendment allowed for the rule's waiver "[i]f a governing sports committee
concludes that accommodating an institution's policy as required by 31.1.4.1 would unduly
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football players, such as pausing for an end-zone prayer, from its general
prohibition against football players celebrating or drawing attention to
themselves on-field.1 6 ' Nondiscrimination or accommodation policies
can also be found within collegiate athletic departments' 62 and state in-
terscholastic athletic associations. 63 Finally, to the extent that an ath-
lete's sport is organizationally or extramurally regulated, in conjunction
with or apart from the state or the school, the athlete's religious prac-
tices may also be protected by the organization's own rules." 4
I. APPLYING THE LEGAL FRAMiEWORK: A SU'RVEY OF CONFLICTS
AND A LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Turning from the exposition to the application of these legal princi-
ples, this part will examine actual and potential cases involving conflicts
between athletes' religious beliefs or practices and the policies or regula-
disrupt the orderly conduct of a championship ...." No. 98-32, NCAA Championships-
Conflicts Due to Religious Conflicts, available at http://www.ncaa.org/databases/legislation/
1998/98-032.html; Bob Lipper, NCAA Throws Religious Athletes Sunday Punch, RICHMOND
TIMEs-DIsPATCH, July 30, 1998, at C1, available at 1998 WL 2041746. The waiver process,
however, was eliminated in 1999. No. 99-64, NCAA Championships-Religious Conflicts,
available at http://www.ncaa.org/databaseslegislation/1999/99-064.htm; Editorial, Reason
Prevails with NCAA, DESERer NEws, Sept. 21, 1999, at A10, available at 1999 WL 26533985.
Other provisions relating to Sunday competition include NCAA Div. I Bylaws 31.1.4.2 &
31.1.4.3, available at https:llgoomer.ncaa.org/wdbctx/LSDBi/LSDBI.home.
161. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, A Reverse in the End Zone: After Liberty's Challenge, NCAA
Clarifies Rule, Allows Praying After Touchdowns, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1995, at C1, available
at 1995 WL 9260020. However, the exemption only came by clarification of the rule's scope,
and only after litigation was looming. Regarding the potential unlawfulness of the rule as
written, see Amanda N. Luftman, Comment, Does the NCAA's Football Rule 9-2 Impede the
Free Exercise of Religion on the Playing Field?, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 445 (1995) (addressing
religion); Jeffrey C. True, The NCAA Celebration Rule: A First Amendment Analysis, 7 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 129 (1997) (addressing speech).
162. The University of Wisconsin Athletic Department, for example, states in a 1996 pol-
icy that it "respects and supports the right of each student-athlete and staff member to wor-
ship or not to worship, and to practice or not to practice, a religion he or she chooses" and that
it "maintains an environment in which student-athletes and employees can work, learn, and
compete free of harassment or intimidation based on religious beliefs or practices." Andy
Baggot, Premium Seats Selling Well So Far, UW Fans Buy Kohl Center Court-Side Plan, Wis.
ST. J., June 16, 1996, at D9, available at 1996 WL 10527949; see also Paul Norton, UW Bans
Mixing Sports, Religion, Wis. ST. J., June 25, 1996, at Al, available at 1996 WL 10528887.
163. See, e.g., Cruz by Cruz v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 157 F. Supp. 2d
485, 487 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (quoting the PIAA Constitution's preambulary declaration that "all
boys and girls should have equal opportunity to participate in all levels of interscholastic ath-
letics regardless of ... creed... [or] religion").
164. See, e.g., Johnny's Icehouse, Inc. v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n of 11., 134 F. Supp. 2d
965, 968 (N.D. 111. 2001) (quoting the nondiscrimination policies of USA Hockey and the
Amateur Hockey Association of Illinois as prohibiting "discrimination on the basis of...
religion").
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tions of schools, officials, or interscholastic entities. It will then offer
several recommendations for the prevention and resolution of such
conflicts.
A. A Survey of Religion-and-Sports Conflicts
1. Substantive Aspects of the Sport
Most conflicts involving an athlete's religious practices are logistical
or otherwise peripheral to the content or substance of the sporting
events themselves, and indeed all of the other categories within this sur-
vey-scheduling, apparel or appearance, and eligibility-address these
types of nonsubstantive conflicts. After all, while some sports may have
religious roots, few today retain any recognizably religious or even ideo-
logical aspects. From time to time, however, athletes do pose religious
objections to one or more substantive elements of the sport itself. To the
extent that such an objection has empirical merit, there is, in fact, a fair
chance that the athlete's claim will succeed, as the athlete will likely be
able to demonstrate a substantial religious burden and the court may
perceive some element of physical or psychological coercion.
Consider a recent controversy involving the requirement within the
sport of judo that competitors engage in various forms of bowing as part
of a tournament. To athletes whose religion prohibits them from bowing
to anyone or anything other than God,a65 or to those who subjectively
perceive the bowing as "reflect[ing] a Shinto religious practice[,] '' 166 this
otherwise inoffensive requirement may give rise to a potential religious
conflict. 167 Although this particular controversy arose in a nongovern-
mental context and has therefore been legally addressed without regard
165. In re Akiyama, Case No. 30-190-994-99, slip op. at 8 (Am. Arb. Ass'n Trib. Aug. 17,
2000) (finding as factual matter (Finding 23) that certain Muslim competitors cannot, consis-
tent with Islam, "bow[ ] to any thing or to anyone other than Allah" and they these competi-
tors have "been disqualified from judo competitions in the United States because of their
refusal to perform any of the required bows"), available at http://www.aboutlaw.com/firm/
bow-html.htm.
166. Id. slip op. at 7 (finding as a factual matter (Findings 19-21) that such a belief is held
by the parents of a Judo competitor and apparently by the competitor herself, and that the
competitor "has been disqualified from judo competitions in the United States because of her
refusal to perform these required bows"). This interpretation of the bowing requirement was
rejected by the arbitration tribunal. Id. slip op. at 8-9 (finding as a factual matter (Finding 26)
that "[t]hese ceremonial bows, as they are practiced in the modern sport of judo, are not
understood or intended by U.S.J.I. [United States Judo Incorperated] to be religious in na-
ture" but rather to be "a secular, traditional sign of respect for the sport and the officials who
administer it, the match that is about to begin, and one's opponent").
167. Amy Shipley, Taking a Bow-or Not, WASH. POST, July 23, 1997, at D8, available at
1997 WL 11975338; Athlete Won't Bow to Tradition, NAT'L L.J., July 10, 2000, at A5; Bowing
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to the Constitution, 68 it nevertheless provides a useful hypothetical for
analysis under the First Amendment. Thus, for example, while the re-
quirement very likely is generally applicable and appears to provide no
discretionary system of waiver, the Shintoism allegation (though proba-
bly difficult to substantiate) at least superficially calls into question the
requirement's neutrality and additionally raises issues of coercion under
both the Free Exercise Clause'6 9 and the Establishment Clause.1
70
Moreover, because bowing is expressive, and the requirement compels
this expression, it is likely that a claimant could also assert a colorable
free speech claim, thereby triggering heightened scrutiny, through hy-
bridization. In fact, this case would appear largely to be controlled by
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,'7 ' cited by the Su-
preme Court as a hybrid rights case,' 72 which prohibited public schools
from requiring students to salute the United States flag while reciting the
pledge of allegiance. 73
Under Pressure?, ABCNEws.coM, Feb. 9, 2000, available at http:1204.202.137.110/sections/
sports/DailyNews/Judobow_000209.html.
168. The competitor has been largely unsuccessful in pressing her claims, both in the
United States and in Canada. In the United States, she initially obtained temporary injunctive
relief from a federal district court. Akiyama v. United States Judo, Inc., No. C97-286L (W.D.
Wash. May 13, 1997); Tradition Violates Religious Freedom, Judge Says in Ruling, SEATTLE
TirEs, June 4, 1997, at B1, available at 1997 WL 3236785. However, her legal assertions have
been unsuccessful when presented to United States Judo, Inc. and before several arbitration
hearings. In re Akiyama, slip op. at 19 (upholding a U.S. Olympic Committee determination
that U.S. Judo's requirement does not violate the religious discrimination prohibition of 36
U.S.C. § 220522(a)(8)), available at http://www.aboutlaw.com/firmlbow-html.htm; Judo Club
Won't Bow to Court, SEATrL:E TIMES, July 6, 1997, at B3 (adverse ruling by five-member U.S.
Judo administrative hearing committee), available at 1997 WL 3241900. In Canada, a similar
claim was turned away on jurisdictional grounds by the British Columbia Human Rights Tri-
bunal. Akiyama v. Judo BC, 2001 BCHRT 4 (B.C. Hum. Rts. Trib. Jan. 16,2001), available at
http://www.bchrt.gov.bc.ca/akiyama.htm; B.C. Rights Panel Rejects Judo Complaint, Spoias-
MAN-REv. (Spokane, Wash.), Feb. 3, 2001, at B2, available at 2001 WL 7045398.
169. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78 (explaining that the Free Exercise Clause, among other
things, prohibits compulsory religious observance); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
170. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 311 (holding that student-led prayers at high
school football games are impermissibly coercive, in part because "some students,.., such as
cheerleaders, members of the band, and, of course, the [football] team members" must be in
attendance, even though the games may be deemed extracurricular); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314
(stating that the government "may not thrust any sect on any person" and "may not make a
religious observance compulsory"); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(per curiam) (holding in effect that the federal military academies' requirement of chapel
attendance was inconsistent with the First Amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
171. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
172. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
173. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (explaining that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein"). Barnette would also appear to govern
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2. Scheduling of Practices and Competitions
Of the conflicts not related to a sport's substantive aspects, those in-
volving scheduling are perhaps the most common. Such conflicts arise
when athletic practices or competitions are inadvertently scheduled on a
day or at a time of regular worship or Sabbath observance, 174 in the
midst of a religious holiday (as was the case with Sandy Koufax), or dur-
ing hours that happen to overlap with formal or informal religious edu-
cation. 175  In general, schools and athletic associations are allowed,
under the free exercise doctrine of permissible accommodation, to at-
tempt to alleviate potential conflicts when setting a season schedule, 176
and they may certainly provide nondiscriminatory individual accommo-
dations on a game-by-game or practice-by-practice basis.1 77 However,
unless the observance is mandated by the athlete's religious beliefs,
school officials are not necessarily required to do S0.178 This is especially
an athlete's religiously based challenge to standing for, and certainly singing, the National
Anthem prior to competition. Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774-75 (D. Ariz. 1963).
174. See supra note 8 (providing newspaper accounts of such conflicts); cf also Soccer
League Asked To Move Games So They Don't Interfere with Religion, SAN DIEGO UNION &
TRIB., Jan. 10, 1997, at E7 (reporting that several churches and synagogues in Larchmont, New
York, had petitioned the local soccer league not to schedule games on Saturday and Sunday
mornings to avoid conflicts with religious services), available at 1997 WL 3110368.
175. See, e.g., Keller, 552 F. Supp. at 514-16 (holding that a rule precluding elementary
school basketball players who miss a practice from playing in the next scheduled game did not,
as applied to a player who missed practices due to weekly catechism classes, violate the Free
Exercise Clause).
176. Cf. Playcrafters, 424 A.2d at 1197-99 (upholding against federal and state nonestab-
lishment claims a policy banning extracurricular activities other than interscholastic athletics
on Friday evenings, Saturdays, and Sunday mornings).
177. See, e.g., Tony Perri, Board to Clarify Policy on Holidays, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 2, 1995, at
3 (Metro N.W.) (reporting that a school board issued a memorandum to teachers, coaches,
and staff providing that "no penalties, sanctions or repercussions may be based on a student's
failure to attend a class, team practice, event or other activity when such failure is based on
the student's indication that such absence was due to religious reasons or for the observance
of a religious holiday or service"), available at 1995 WL 6251614; Silk, supra note 9 (reporting
that the athletic directors of the collegiate Southeast Conference rescheduled a track and field
championship event to accommodate a Seventh Day Adventist competitor, and that earlier in
the year the NCAA had scheduled certain basketball games to accommodate a member of the
Worldwide Church of God); cf. Rangers to Adjust Pitching Schedule to Allow for Correa's
Religious Beliefs, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1988, at 2 (reporting that the Texas Rangers agreed not
to make Edwin Correa, a Seventh Day Adventist, pitch from sundown Fridays to sundown
Saturdays, his Sabbath, unless necessary). available at 1988 WL 2299155.
178. Keller, 552 F. Supp. at 514-16 (holding that a rule precluding elementary school bas-
ketball players who miss a practice, except in cases of illness or death in the family, from
playing in the next scheduled game did not, as applied to a player who missed practices due to
weekly catechism classes, violate the Free Exercise Clause, particularly because the classes
were not truly mandatory); cf. Boyle v. Jerome Country Club, 883 F. Supp. 1422, 1429-32 (D.
Idaho 1995) (holding that, in the absence of demonstrated and unrebutted religious discrimi-
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true where the impact of the requested schedule change would be wide-
spread-affecting many athletes or many events-rather than confined
in scope.
179
3. Regulations of Appearance and Apparel
Another category of nonsubstantive conflicts involves challenges to
regulations governing an athlete's appearance or apparel, including
equipment, uniforms, and accessories. A school or coach may have a
grooming policy, for instance, but an athlete's religious beliefs may re-
quire facial hair that does not conform to the policy.180 Or, a regulation
may for safety reasons prohibit headwear during competitions, contrary
to an orthodox Jewish athlete's obligation to wear a head covering 8' or
nation, a country club's refusal to reschedule a golfer's tournament time from Sunday to an-
other day was not a violation of Title H of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a,
which prohibits religious discrimination by places of public accommodation). The Keller case
may be analyzed and perhaps resolved differently today pursuant to the individualized assess-
ment (and possibly the general applicability) standard of Smith, 494 U.S. 872. See supra notes
90-108 and accompanying text.
179. Berg, supra note 154, at 559 (suggesting in regard to state religious freedom laws that
"courts will likely consider whether the accommodation would change the school's policy or
schedule for all students, or whether it would simply allow the objecting student to opt out of
attending on the day in dispute" and that, "[w]hile even opt outs can create administrative
difficulties for the school, especially if a large number of such claims arise, the difficulties
multiply when the school is not just setting a different schedule for one student but is changing
the overall schedule for all"). But cf. Nat Hentoff, Not on the Sabbath, WASH. PosT, Sept. 12,
1987, at A21 (describing an apparently unreported federal district court decision holding that
a school board violated the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to accommodate a Jewish stu-
dent's request that high school graduation be moved from Saturday to Sunday), available at
1987 WL 2026278.
180. Some faiths either prohibit their adherents from cutting their hair or require their
adherents to arrange their hair in a particular way. Such issues frequently arise in the prison
context. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 573 (2d Cir. 1990) (members of Ras-
tafarian faith), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951 (1990); Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345, 1346
(4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (member of a Cherokee religious order); Phipps v. Parker, 879 F.
Supp. 734, 735 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (orthodox Hasidic Jew); Wellmaker v. Dahill, 836 F. Supp.
1375, 1377 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (follower of the Nubian Islamic Hebrew faith); Wright v. Raines,
457 F. Supp. 1082, 1083 (D. Kan. 1978) (practitioner of the Sikh religion).
181. See, e.g., Menora, 683 F.2d at 1033-36 (holding that Orthodox Jewish players were
not constitutionally burdened by a general ban on headwear because their desired accommo-
dation-wearing yarmulkes fastened by bobby pins-was not mandated by Jewish law, but
remanding for consideration of other alternatives not incongruent with the objective of
safety); cf also Harris v. New York State Athletic Comm'n, 392 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977) (holding that state athletic commission's safety-motivated refusal to allow a boxer
to wear a skullcap for religious reasons did not violate the boxer's religious freedom).
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an orthodox Sunni Muslim athlete's duty to wear a prayer cap.182 Or an
athletic association rule, also for safety reasons, may prohibit jewelry
during competitions, but a devout Christian athlete may believe that he
or she should wear a cross at all times. 183
Grooming or clean-shaven policies for athletes are somewhat diffi-
cult to assess because they appear rarely, if ever, to be challenged on
free exercise grounds, and their track record under other constitutional
provisions is a rather mixed one.1 84 However, to the extent that such a
policy or its application includes only nonreligious exemptions (such as
medical necessity), or to the extent that an athlete's personal appearance
is independently protected by the First or Fourteenth Amendments (as a
matter of expression or privacy), there is a distinct possibility that the
policy, if ever challenged, will be subjected to some form of heightened
judicial scrutiny. In turn, absent an unyielding confidence that the policy
is necessary to achieve a compelling interest, or that an athlete's request
is clearly insincere, administrators should strongly consider granting re-
ligious exemptions to grooming rules, particularly where the institutional
costs of doing so are minimal.
Headwear rules are on somewhat firmer ground, in part because they
are often and manifestly rooted in concerns for player safety. Generally,
such rules prohibit headwear during competition, although they may
182. Cf., e.g., In re Palmer, 386 A.2d 1112, 1114-16 (R.I. 1978) (holding that a trial judge
violated a party's free exercise rights by not considering the religious grounds for wearing the
prayer cap).
183. See, e.g., Bob Wolfley, Selig Doesn't Spare Praise for "*61, ": Hold Your Tongue, MIL-
WAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 29, 2001, at C2 (noting "[the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic
Association's long-standing ban on jewelry for high school athletes during competition"),
available at 2001 WL 9353113; Schools Get Right to the Point with Body Piercing, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland, OH), Feb. 8, 1999, at B10 (reporting that "[t]he Ohio High School Ath-
letic Association prohibits jewelry of any kind, for safety reasons"), available at 1999 WL
2348108.
184. Compare Davenport by Davenport v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ., 730 F.2d 1395,
1397-98 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding under the Fourteenth Amendment a high school coach's
"clean shaven" policy as applied to basketball and football players), and Neuhaus v. Torrey,
310 F. Supp. 192, 193-95 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (upholding under the Fourteenth Amendment a
school district athletic grooming regulation as applied to high school athletes), and Humphries
v. Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd., 467 So. 2d 870, 872 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding under the
Fourteenth Amendment a high school football coach's clean shaven rule as applied to players
during the season), with Long v. Zopp, 476 F.2d 180, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment a high school football coach's "hair code" as
applied to a team member off-season), and Dostert v. Berthold Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 391 F.
Supp. 876, 881-83 (D.N.D. 1975) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment a board of
education hair policy as applied to high school athletic participation), and Dunham, 312 F.
Supp. at 414-21 (invalidating under the Equal Protection Clause a high school athletic groom-
ing code as applied to male tennis players).
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contain an exception for certain headwear (such as a sweatband) which,
because it can be held securely in place and may even assist an athlete's
vision, is consistent with the objective of safety. The most famous of the
athletic headwear cases is the Seventh Circuit's Menora v. Illinois High
School Association, which involved just such a rule and included a re-
quest by Orthodox Jewish basketball players that, despite the rule, they
be able to wear yarmulkes fastened by bobby pins.'85 Although techni-
cally the appeals court decided against the athletes, finding that Jewish
law required a headcovering but not necessarily a yarmulke, 186 it re-
manded to the trial court with the understanding that the players might
propose a more secure headcovering, and that should they succeed in
doing so, the Free Exercise Clause would very likely mandate that ac-
commodation. 87 Menora, however, was decided prior to the Supreme
Court's 1990 rollback of free exercise doctrine, and today such an ac-
commodation would be mandatory, if at all, exclusively under the hybrid
rights doctrine. Headwear rules are, in all likelihood, neutral and gener-
ally applicable, and they probably do not have in place of mechanism for
individualized assessment. But the headcovering may very well be ex-
pressive within the meaning of the Free Speech Clause, thereby allowing
the claimant to interpose a free exercise-free speech hybrid claim.' 88
Absent such a showing, however, the claimant would have to demon-
strate the irrationality of the headwear rule, and this would be a difficult
task indeed.
The analysis of jewelry prohibitions is similar to that of headwear
rules. Both are legitimately rooted in safety concerns, and both may in-
advertently impinge on symbolic religious expression. Certainly a coach
or administrator cannot constitutionally discriminate among types of re-
ligious jewelry, allowing a Christian athlete to wear a crucifix, for exam-
ple, but not allowing a Wiccan athlete to wear a pentagram.8 9 Even
185. 683 F.2d 1030. For commentary, see Judith M. Mills, Note, Recent Development:
Menora v. Illinois High School Association: Basketball Players' Free Exercise Rights Compro-
mised-Technical Foul, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1487; Kurt H. Feuerschwenger, Note, Inconsistent
Judicial Protection of Religious Conduct: The Seventh Circuit Contributes to the Confusion in
Menora v. Illinois State igh School Association, 32 DEPAUL L. REv. 433 (1983).
186. Menora, 683 F.2d at 1033-34.
187. Id. at 1035-36. According to Professor Berg, "[t]he parties eventually settled on this
basis .. . ." Berg, supra note 154, at 558.
188. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 525 (1986) (quoting from the petitioner's dep-
osition that, "for many ... Jews, 'a yarmulke is an expression of respect for God... intended
to keep the wearer aware of God's presence"').
189. Cf Students Win Right To Wear Pentagram, GRAND RAPIDs PRESs, Mar. 23, 1999, at
B4 (reporting about a school district's reversal of its prohibition on wearing pentagrams after
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neutral and generally applicable prohibitions may be subjected to
heightened or strict scrutiny, however, if the athlete can assert a hybrid-
ized free exercise-free speech claim based on the inherently expressive
nature of religious jewelry. 190 In turn, because safety is almost certainly
a compelling interest, whether a jewelry prohibition can withstand
heightened scrutiny will largely depend on whether it is the least restric-
tive means of achieving that objective. And, to the extent that the jew-
elry may be "taped to the body so as not to be a hazard to the player or
others[,]' 91 as one model rule provides, the rule's defender may have
difficulty arguing that a total ban is, in fact, necessary or the least restric-
tive means available. Of course, the actual outcome of that assessment
in any given case will depend on the particular sport or competition and
the nature of the jewelry in question.
4. Requirements for Eligibility
A fourth and final category involves religiously based decisions that
render athletes, under governing regulations, ineligible to participate in
their particular sports. A prospective athlete may have a religious objec-
tion to immunizations, for example, but the school district mandates tet-
anus immunization as a condition for eligibility in interscholastic
sports. 192 Or, a student who for religious reasons is home-schooled may,
a federal district court indicated that the prohibition, as applied to the particular student, was
unconstitutional), available at 1999 WL 6411589.
190. The paradigmatic student symbolic expression case is Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which held that a school could not prohibit students
from wearing anti-war black armbands without demonstrating that "the wearing of the arm-
bands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of
other students." Id. at 509. In recent years, there have been several successful challenges to
school dress codes that have restricted the wearing of religious symbols. See, e.g., Chalifoux,
976 F. Supp. at 664-67, 670-71 (holding that a ban on the visible wearing of rosaries, imposed
in an effort to suppress gang activity and identification, violated the First Amendment Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses); Diego Ribadeneira & Michael Paulson, Alabama Student
Permitted To Wear Cross Outside Clothing: School System Must Amend its Dress Code, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 2000, at B2 (reporting a school board's litigation-induced settlement with
a sixth-grade student who was forbidden under the school's dress code to visibly wear a cross
necklace, though Alabama has a state RFRA), available at 2000 WL 3316342; School Board
Relents on Star of David Ban, ATLANTA J.- CONST., Aug. 24, 1999, at A7 (describing a school
board's since-rescinded decision not to allow a Jewish student to wear a Star of David neck-
lace, as part of its larger ban on gang symbols), available at 1999 WL 3793100. For guidance
on drafting constitutionally acceptable dress regulations, see Christopher B. Gilbert, We Are
What We Wear: Revisiting Student Dress Codes, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 3.
191. NAT'L FED'N OF STATE HIGH SCH. Ass'NS, supra note 97, R. 1-10-2.
192. Calandra, 512 A.2d at 811 (holding that an interscholastic baseball program could
exclude a would-be participant who refused for religious reasons to receive a tetanus immuni-
zation, finding that "participation in interscholastic sports ... does not rise to the level of an
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when attempting to participate in interscholastic athletics, discover that
school enrollment is a prerequisite to such participation. 193 Or, a pro-
spective athlete may for religious reasons transfer to a religious school
only to find that the state athletic association deems transferring stu-
dents ineligible to play for one year.194
Eligibility conflicts have generally been resolved by courts in favor of
the schools, not the athletes. Challenges to transfer rules, in particular,
have been uniformly unsuccessful,195 usually because the athletes are un-
able to demonstrate that the regulation places a constitutionally suffi-
cient burden upon their religious beliefs or practices. 96 If there is (or
will be) any possible exception to this overwhelming pattern of failure, it
important government benefit" and therefore the administrative exclusion does not burden
the child's free exercise of religion).
193. Casey Banas, Playing for the Home Team After Fighting to Play Football for Hinsdale
Central High, Home-School Student Brian Griffen Takes it One Tackle at a Time, CH. TRm.,
Sept. 30, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 2917231; Scott Cooper, Thrown for a Loss: Home-
Schooler Can't Play Football at East Central, TULSA WORLD, June 5, 1997, at All, available at
1997 WL 3640042; Kristina M. Knapcik, Home-Schooled Boy's Family Goes to Court Over
Football, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 9, 1997, at 10, available at 1997 WL 12727631; Shan-
non Ryan, Sharing the Sports Arena: Home-Schooled Kids Aim for Equal Chance, S. BEND.
TRIB., July 25, 1999, at Cl, available at 1999 WL 21431515.
194. See, e.g., Robbins, 941 F. Supp. at 792; Beck by Beck v. Missouri State High Sch.
Activities Ass'n, 837 F. Supp. 998, 1002-03 (E.D. Mo. 1993), judgment vacated and appeal
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, 18 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 1994); Cooper, 629 P.2d at 390-91;
Chabert v. Louisiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 323 So. 2d 774, 780 (La. 1975).
195. See, e.g., Walsh, 616 F.2d at 158; Robbins, 941 F. Supp. at 792; Poret v. Louisiana
High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, No. Civ. A. 96-1194, 1996 WL 169241, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 1996);
Beck, 837 F. Supp. at 1002-03; Miss. High Sch. Activities Ass'n v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768,
775-76 (Miss. 1994); Cooper, 629 P.2d at 390-91; Chabert, 323 So. 2d at 780; cf. Alerding, 591 F.
Supp. at 1539 (citing a prior unpublished decision, Zeiler v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n,
Slip Op. No. 83-765 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 1984), affd, 755 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 818 (1985), as holding that Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n Bylaw 4, § 6.4-
6.10, which prohibits participation by athletes whose parents reside outside Ohio, does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause).
196. Walsh, 616 F.2d at 158 (finding a "de minimis nature of the burden placed on the
plaintiffs' free exercise of religion"); Robbins, 941 F. Supp. at 792 (finding "no evidence that
the rights of parents and students to practice their religion have been unduly burdened in this
case"); Poret, 1996 WL 169241, at *2 (finding no constitutionally impermissible burden); Beck,
837 F. Supp. at 1003 (discerning no "evidence regarding the impact of the restriction on plain-
tiffs or his parents' religious practice or beliefs").
The Association's anti-recruitment rule does not prevent a parent or child from actively
practicing their chosen religion. A student may enroll in a private school and take ad-
vantage of the religious education offered. The Association's anti-recruitment regula-
tion does not regulate the conduct of student athletes to the point of interfering with
any religious practice.
Coleman, 631 So. 2d at 776. See also Cooper, 629 P.2d at 390-91 (finding that "the transfer
rule's impact on plaintiffs' religious freedom is minimal" and is not "sufficient to invalidate it
on religious freedom grounds"); Win. Nicholas Chango, Jr., Case Note, Mississippi High
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is likely to involve home-schooled students who are barred completely
from interscholastic athletic participation despite their residency within
the school district.197 In several states, the issue has already been re-
solved by the promulgation of statutory provisions, educational regula-
tions, or athletic association rules that either allow or require school
districts to permit extracurricular (including athletic) participation by
home-schooled students. 19 In other states and localities, administrators
have been willing to waive the eligibility rules, though often after ex-
tended requests and periodically with curricular conditions attached.1 99
In the remaining states, particularly those without RFRA-like pro-
tection, the Free Exercise Clause may prove helpful insofar as relig-
iously-based home-schooling implicates not merely free exercise, but
arguably a conjunctive claim of parental rights as well, resulting in a hy-
brid claim potentially capable of triggering heightened scrutiny. Al-
though, as noted, parental rights claims in the athletic or extracurricular
context have largely failed to date,"°° typically these have involved at-
School Activities Association v. Coleman, 631 So. 2d 768 (Miss. 1994), 6 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 251 (1996).
197. For general analysis on the access of home-schooled students to extracurricular activ-
ities, including athletics, see Eugene C. Bjorklun, Commentary, Home Schooled Students: Ac-
cess to Public School Extracurricular Activities, 109 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1996); Michael Brian
Dailey, Home Schooled Children Gaining Limited Access to Public Schools, 28 J.L. & EDUC.
25 (1999); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Commentary, Parental Rights and Home Schooling: Current
Home Schooling Litigation, 135 EDUC. L. REP. 313, 317-19 (1999); Derwin L. Webb, Chalk
Talk: Home-Schools and Interscholastic Sports: Denying Participation Violates United States
Constitutional Due Process and Equal Protection Rights, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 123 (1997); William
Grob, Note, Access Denied: Prohibiting Homeschooled Students from Participating in Public-
School Athletics and Activities, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 823 (2000).
198. David W. Fuller, Note, Public School Access: The Constitutional Right of Home-
Schoolers To "Opt In" to Public Education on a Part-Time Basis, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1599, 1615
n.73 (1998) (citing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-802.01 (West Supp. 1995); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 22-33-104.5(6) (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.425 (West Supp. 1996); IDAHO
CODE § 33-203; ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5110- 20.24; IOWA CODE ANN. § 281-31.5(299A) (West
1988 & Supp. 1996); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 5021 (West 1993); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 193A:2(II) (Supp. 1995); N.M. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 195:7, 195:8; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15-34.1-06 (1993 & Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.460 (1995); UTAH STATE BD. OF
EDuc. REG. R277-438-4; VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-253-13:1(H) (Michie 1997); Wash. Common
Sch. Provisions 28A.150.350; Wyo. High Sch. Activities Ass'n Rules 3.1.3, 6.2.0, 6.4). See also
Dailey, supra note 197, at 32-34 (discussing a number of the state statutory provisions).
199. See, e.g., Banas, supra note 193, at 1 (reporting about an Illinois high school football
player who was eventually allowed by the school district to compete, though only after three
appearances by his mother, including "verbal appeals and written statements she submitted to
the board"); Cooper, supra note 193, at All (reporting about an Indianapolis high school
football player and wrestler who "was allowed on the teams after his family made repeated
requests to the Indiana High School Athletic Association").
200. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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tempts to alter existing programs. By comparison, home-schooling par-
ents typically seek nothing more than inclusion within an extracurricular
program as it stands.2 ° There is, moreover, virtually no risk that the
child is being home-schooled to bypass the safeguards against abusive
recruitment (as is the concern in transfer ineligibility cases), and the
hardship on the child-potentially no interscholastic sports at all-may
be much more severe than in the transfer cases, where eligibility is nor-
mally attained after one year.20 2 Nevertheless, to date, home-schooling
claims for extracurricular participation have garnered little or no success
when presented under the hybrid rights concept,20 3 and at best limited
success when presented under other constitutional provisions.2°
201. But cf. Swanson, 135 F.3d at 700 (perceiving no constitutionally significant distinction
between parental efforts to exempt public school students from objectionable classes, which
have largely been rejected, and parental efforts to have home-schooled children attend se-
lected public school classes on a part-time basis, and thereby holding that no hybrid claim
results from the latter situation).
202. In some areas, home-schooled athletes have few opportunities apart from recrea-
tional leagues. See, e.g., Joanne C. Gerstner, Kids Searching for Teams: Home Schoolers Try to
be Included in Public-School Sports, DETorr Nnws, May 26, 1999, at D1 (noting the impact
of the Michigan High School Athletic Association eligibility rules on athletic opportunities for
home-schooled students), available at 1999 WL 3926603; Demorris Lee, Home-Schooled Stu-
dents Have Few Options for Team Sports, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 2,2001, at
8N (reporting on the predicament of home-schooled athletes in light of the North Carolina
High School Athletic Association rule requiring high school enrollment as a condition to ath-
letic participation), available at 2001 WL 3450546. Due to these limitations, in recent years
several home-schooled athletic teams and leagues have been created. Kim Brown, Homes-
choolers Prepare for Sports Season, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 18, 2000, at 4, available at 2000 WL
6801445; Todd Jacobson, Students of the Game: Patchwork Team of Home Schoolers Overcome
Hassles for Love of Basketball, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2001, at D14, available at 2001 WL
2544854; Dawn Ziegenbalg, Getting a Shot: Sports Leagues for Home-Schoolers Arise to Meet
Growing Need, WINSTON-SALEM J. (N.C.), Nov. 5, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 27230182.
203. Mawdsley, supra note 197, at 326-28; Grob, supra note 197, at 835-36. Cf. Thomas v.
Allegany County Bd. of Educ., 443 A.2d 622, 625 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (holding that a
school board's refusal to allow home-schooled students to participate in its all-county music
program did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because "[t]he rule neither prohibits a par-
ent from enrolling the child in a private school, nor deters the students from following the
practices of their faith" but "merely prevents a child from reaping the benefits of a public
school activity once the constitutional right to a private school education is exercised" such
that "[t]he impact of the rule on freedom of religion is minimal").
204. Compare Davis v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, No. CA942887, 1995
WL 808968, at *2-*3 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (preliminarily enjoining MIAA rule 65,
which requires school attendance to participate in interscholastic athletics, because the classi-
fication between in-school and home-school status is not rationally related to the state's legiti-
mate interest as prescribed by federal and state equal protection doctrine), with McNatt by
McNatt v. Frazier Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 95-0366, 1995 WL 568380 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1995)
(holding that disallowing participation by home-schooled students in school district's athletics
program, based on the district's eligibility rules, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause),
and Bradstreet v. Sobol, 650 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that the
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B. Recommendations for Administrators and Athletic Personnel
As this article demonstrates, the legal posture of athletic and school
administrators vis-a-vis students is not always an enviable one. These
administrators are regularly confronted by seemingly countless, some-
times conflicting directives issued by state and local officials, legislators,
courts, lawyers, parents, and, to some extent, even students. The pur-
pose of this final section is to offer a number of moderately concrete and
fairly clear-cut guidelines for the handling of religion-related conflicts
between athletes and school or association rules, decisions, or policies.
1. Approach All Accommodation Requests Seriously
The first recommendation is that administrators and athletic person-
nel should take every request for religious accommodation seriously.
This does not necessarily mean that every request must be granted. But
administrators should proceed as if each request may have legal merit
and, in turn, as if their actions might eventually be challenged and scruti-
nized in a court of law. Taking a claim seriously basically means the
following: If time permits, indicate to the athlete that the matter will be
given due consideration. Then, consult with the appropriate administra-
tors or legal counsel and promptly provide a response to the athlete. If
time does not permit-if the request is made shortly before a competi-
tion, for example-then either allow the requested accommodation with
no guarantee of future allowances, or deny the requested accommoda-
tion on the basis of a plausible, religion-neutral reason (that is, one hav-
ing nothing to do with the underlying or comparative validity of the
religious claim itself). Examples of religion-neutral reasons include sup-
portable claims of health or safety, logistical impossibility, prejudice to
the team or program (such as a resulting forfeit or disqualification), or
undue cost or delay. In either event, as soon as possible thereafter con-
sult with the appropriate administrators or legal counsel and carefully
devise a policy to handle subsequent requests.
A corollary to this first recommendation is that administrators should
never respond to a requested accommodation by questioning the sincer-
ity or legitimacy of the athlete's religious beliefs or practices, let alone by
ridiculing or rejecting them outright. At least two reasons, one legal and
the other ethical, undergird this specific admonition. First, should the
conflict eventually result in litigation, an initial administrative failure to
exclusion of a home-schooled student from participation in interscholastic athletics violated
neither the Due Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause).
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take the request seriously can only be disadvantageous. Even if the gov-
erning law does not ultimately require an accommodation of the request,
it almost certainly prohibits discrimination against or among religious
beliefs, and failure to take a claim seriously at the outset may constitute
an entirely unnecessary violation of the law. Second, it is ethically im-
proper not to take the request seriously. Even if the request or the un-
derlying religion is a sham, and the athlete is merely attempting to cause
disruption or seek attention or special treatment, the coach or adminis-
trator should still perceive that this athlete is in need of assistance, psy-
chological or otherwise. Summarily dismissing the athlete's request will
likely not help, and may aggravate, this larger problem.
2. Address All Religions Equally and Similar Religious Claims
Similarly
The second recommendation is that administrators and athletic per-
sonnel should treat all religions equally and should treat similar religious
claims similarly. When considering to grant or deny a requested accom-
modation, administrators should assume that they will have to reach the
same outcome with regard to every subsequent request under the same
or any similar rule. Thus, if an administrator denies a scheduling accom-
modation to a Seventh-Day Adventist athlete (whose Sabbath is Satur-
day), then the next time around the administrator must be willing to
deny the same type of accommodation to a Lutheran or Baptist athlete
(whose Sabbath is Sunday). Likewise, if an administrator allows a Jew-
ish athlete to wear a Star of David by waiving a no-jewelry rule, then the
administrator must also be willing to allow a Wiccan athlete to wear a
pentagram. As noted repeatedly in this article, the law strongly disfa-
vors inequality of treatment between different religions, and even in ju-
risdictions that have no special protection for religious practices,
interdenominational religious discrimination by government actors will
always be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.
3. Accord Equal Consideration to Religious and Nonreligious
Requests
The third recommendation is that administrators and athletic person-
nel should entertain religious requests for accommodation to the same
extent that they consider nonreligious requests for accommodation. So,
for example, if an administrator treats medical or family problems as
potential grounds for exemption from an otherwise applicable regula-
tion, or if the regulation itself expressly lists these as bases for exemp-
tion, then similar consideration should be given to an exemption request
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that is based on an athlete's religious beliefs or practices. Again, the
religious accommodation may or may not have to be provided; that deci-
sion will generally depend upon the balance of interests. But religious
reasons cannot be categorically excluded from consideration when waiv-
ers are provided (even infrequently) for nonreligious reasons, especially
when the nonreligious reasons are not discernibly consistent with the
objectives of the regulation.
4. Attempt to Reasonably Accommodate Every Claim
The fourth recommendation is that administrators and athletic per-
sonnel, when confronted by an accommodation request, should make an
affirmative and good faith effort to consider (if not ultimately provide)
such an accommodation. This is obviously the correct approach if it ap-
pears from a careful legal analysis that an accommodation may be re-
quired by federal or state law. Even if not required, however, it remains
the recommended approach. If there is flexibility in the regulation, and
if the administrative burden is minimal, then an accommodation should
be forthcoming if only out of institutional integrity and a concern for
public relations. And, should the request eventually evolve into a law-
suit, the school or athletic association will be in a much more favorable
position if it appears as though the claim was respectfully considered and
a reasonable effort was made to find a workable accommodation. Al-
though courts periodically overlook a defendant's insolicitude towards
an accommodation request, 0 5 such insensitivity can itself constitute a
needless violation of the First Amendment20 6 and can only harm the de-
fendant's legal posture, whether or not a legal violation is ultimately
found.2 °7
205. Cf, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771,778 (7th Cir. 1998) (commenting
that an employer's "failure to respond to [an employee's] formal request" for a religious ac-
commodation "gives us some pause," though finding no violation of Title VII), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1144 (1999).
206. See, e.g., In re Palmer, 386 A.2d at 1114-16 (holding that a trial judge violated the
free exercise rights of a person appearing before the court who was wearing a "takia" prayer
cap, because, "[a]lthough [he] and his counsel made several abortive efforts to explain the
nature and sincerity of the religious beliefs expressed by [him] in the wearing of the symbolic
prayer cap, the trial justice did not attempt to discover whether these beliefs were sincerely
held or whether they precluded petitioner from removing his takia in court").
207. Cf., e.g., Nation in Brief, ATLANTA J.-CoNsT., July 18, 2001, at A9 (reporting on a
jury verdict awarding $2.25 million to an employee who was fired for refusing to work on his
Sabbath, where one of his managers refused to accommodate his religious observance and
"called his religious belief 'a scam"'), available at 2001 WL 3682592.
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5. Avoid Litigation Unless Genuinely Necessary
The fifth recommendation is that administrators and athletic person-
nel should avoid litigation, including conduct precipitating litigation, un-
less their institution is fully committed to defending the regulation in a
legal proceeding and is prepared to incur whatever costs may result from
that defense. At the very least, these might include legal fees and court-
awarded damages. But monetary costs should not be the only concern.
Even if a prospective case appears to be a sure winner for the school or
association, this legal victory may entail significant qualitative expense to
the institution, such as friction within the athletic program or adverse
public and alumni relations. To be sure, conflicts involving religion and
sports, precisely because of the importance of each, can be among the
most heated and polarizing legal disputes that an organization or com-
munity may face. In turn, gauging the "necessity" of litigation should
entail determining not only that an accommodation would clearly thwart
the legitimate or compelling objectives of the rule in question, but also
that preserving the rule manifestly outweighs these possible qualitative
harms. If the institution is not certain that this calculus dictates litiga-
tion, then it should give serious consideration to informally resolving the
conflict by means of voluntary accommodation, thereby generally pre-
serving the integrity and enforceability of the rule while nevertheless
freeing the athlete from the burden that the rule imposes.
6. Anticipate Religious Conflicts When Drafting Rules
The sixth and final recommendation is that administrators and ath-
letic personnel should draft rules that anticipate potential religious con-
flicts and, when drafting such rules, to do so in consultation with legal
counsel, clergy or religious leaders, and parents or the public at large.
This process of anticipating potential conflicts has both a general compo-
nent and a specific component. The general component addresses
whether the institution believes it appropriate to consider religious ac-
commodation requests at all, regardless of the particulars, and to craft a
rule that comports both with the answer to that question and with the
requirements of the First Amendment. It may be that religious accom-
modations of any sort are considered undesirable, but then administra-
tors must make sure that the rule is neutral, is generally applicable, and
does not allow for accommodation or waiver requests of any kind, and if
the rule does have exceptions that these exceptions are not inconsistent
with the rule's objectives.
The specific component of this anticipation process addresses the ac-
tual religious conflicts that might arise and, based on that information,
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allows administrators either to rethink or to refine their initial, more
general posture. It is at this specific stage, of course, that the role of
consultation, especially with religious leaders, becomes important. Such
consultation can shed light on both the diversity of religious beliefs
within the community and the particular manifestations of those be-
liefs-Saturday Sabbaths, head coverings, religious holidays, dietary re-
quirements, and so forth-that may later give rise to difficult conflicts if
not addressed during the formulation of the rule. Administrators should
note, however, that if an advisory committee is used and the committee
formally includes clergy solely because of their status as clergy,2 °s they
should be drawn from a variety of faiths and under no circumstances
should they be delegated actual rulemaking authority.20 9
CONCLUSION
As noted at the very outset of the article, athletic participation and
religious observance appear to be two of Americans' most cherished en-
deavors. When these endeavors collide, and when the collision is due
partly to a governmental regulation or policy, the Free Exercise Clause
may very well dictate how this conflict between competition and con-
science is resolved. The First Amendment's principal message in this
regard is that regulations must be religiously neutral and generally appli-
cable, and that religious requests for accommodation must be treated
with at least the same solicitude that administrators display towards non-
religious requests (although more favorable treatment is in many in-
stances permissible as well). The government may also have to bend its
regulations where the athlete's predicament implicates not only free ex-
ercise, but also a conjunctive constitutional claim such as free speech or
the right of parents to direct their children's education. To the extent
208. It is not necessarily a violation of the Establishment Clause to provide for the inclu-
sion of religious leaders-solely because of their status as such-on governmental advisory
committees. New York State Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. Sobol, 591 N.E.2d 1146, 1147, 1148-52 (N.Y.
1992) (upholding a state regulation providing that an AIDS "advisory council shall consist of
parents, school board members, appropriate school personnel, and community representa-
tives, including representatives from religious organizations"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 909 (1992).
However, it would presumably be a violation to exclude them because of that status. McDan-
iel, 435 U.S. at 626-29 (plurality opinion) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the
exclusion of clergy from political office).
209. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127 (explaining that the Establishment Clause prohibits "impor-
tant, discretionary governmental powers" from being "delegated to or shared with religious
institutions"): Sobol, 591 N.E.2d at 1150 (emphasizing the importance of the fact that the
committee to which the religious representatives were appointed "serve[s] in a purely advisory
role" and that the entities which it advises "retain the unfettered and nondelegable public
responsibility and discretion to adopt or reject any advisory views in whole or in part").
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that governments abide by these norms, the First Amendment otherwise
permits them generally to regulate in any rational manner, and pursue
any legitimate objectives, which they deem appropriate.
This is not to say that other federal and especially state laws might
not also be implicated. In fact they might, depending on the jurisdiction,
the legal status of the educational institution, the nature of the athletic
regulation, and the particular circumstances of the alleged religious in-
fringement. In some states, for example, strict scrutiny may apply to
government regulations even if they are neutral and generally applica-
ble. In others, the religious rights of students or student-athletes may be
specifically protected. While in others, or in certain interscholastic ve-
nues, the regulations themselves may provide for certain forms of relig-
ious accommodation.
In addition to following the general guidelines set forth in this article,
therefore, administrators and athletic personnel must keep apprised of
the religious freedom laws within their own jurisdiction. This is an un-
usually dynamic area of law at present, and the overall trajectory is one
of enhancing the protections afforded to religious practices, particularly
in relation to the actions of government. By keeping so apprised, and by
respecting the First Amendment norms discussed in this article, adminis-
trators and athletic personnel who are confronted by requests for relig-
ious accommodation can hopefully prevent these requests from
mushrooming into full-blown conflicts, thereby minimizing friction
within their athletic programs, poor public relations, and, of course, po-
tential legal liability.

